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Derek Gregory and Noel Castree
Introduction
When we were invited by Sage to identify published work in human geography that represents what is best and most distinctive about the field it seemed an impossible task (it still does) because there is 
such a rich volume of material to draw from. We decided to focus on English-
language and to a lesser extent other European contributions, although we are 
acutely aware of the irony, even the imperialism, of limiting a field like human 
geography to knowledges rooted in only a fraction of the world. We discuss 
below the dangers of delimiting Geography as a European or Euro-American 
science, and several of our selections return to this issue again and again. 
If there is a much richer geography of Geography than this, there is also a 
much longer history than our selections might imply. Our focus on the last 
thirty years is not an exercise in progressivism or triumphalism which treats 
the present as the climactic moment in a chain of contributions that reaches 
back into an ever more distant and ever more imperfect past. Here too our 
decision was a purely pragmatic way to confine our search.
Even within these geographical and historical limits it was difficult to 
make a judicious selection – and we know how many contributions we had 
to excise at the eleventh hour for fear of turning five volumes into fifty – 
because human geography, perhaps more than most disciplines, is so hetero-
dox. Its practitioners set their intellectual compasses according to no one 
philosophy; no dominant theoretical framework overshadows all others; 
methodological pluralism is the order of the day; topical diversity is the norm, 
as is heterogeneity in the research questions asked and data generated; puta-
tively ‘objective’ approaches rub shoulders with avowedly ‘political’ ones; the 
rigorously cerebral and insistently practical jostle for attention; and human 
geographers draw intellectual inspiration from every conceivable field, with 
some favouring the arts and humanities, others the wider social sciences, and 
still others the environmental and life sciences.
This may sound like a discipline in crisis – indeed, something scarcely 
worthy of the title ‘discipline’. And yet the selections that we include in these 
five volumes show that – even within our narrow pre-determined limits – the 
field of human geography is remarkably fecund: it would undoubtedly seem 
even richer if we extended those geographical and historical horizons. In large 
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part this positive judgement rests on a rethinking of what we mean by a discip-
line. An older meaning – inculcation into a canonical body of knowledge, a sort 
of academic holy writ, upon which one slowly builds to become a ‘disciple’ – 
has given way to a newer meaning: exposure to a variety of knowledges that 
share a family resemblance and which provide the means for critical, crea-
tive inventions not mere additions or supplements to the existing stocks of 
knowledge. Geographers John Agnew and James Duncan suggest that it is 
‘the absence of a disciplining orthodoxy’ and ‘the openness to fresh thinking 
that now makes the field so interesting.’ This might be qualified in several 
ways. Human geography has not altogether abandoned a canon, and its work-
ing practices are still ‘disciplined’ in senses that owe less to the monastery 
than Michael Foucault. Its courses and syllabuses, its textbooks and journals, 
its examinations and dissertations, its refereeing and reviewing: all work to 
produce ‘disciplinary subjects’ of a sort – students, teachers, researchers – and 
to normalise particular conceptions of what does and does not count as suc-
cessful and significant ‘geography’. But that last sentence is full of plurals, 
and it is the plurality of conceptions, their co-existence but still more their 
interpenetration – the astonishing proliferation of hybrid geographies that 
combine different approaches, old sub-disciplines and new inquiries without 
ever congealing into a single orthodoxy – that Agnew and Duncan celebrate: 
to them, human geography is ‘amazingly pluralistic’.1
So it is, but those who are less sanguine worry that human geography 
has become a house divided: a large building with many rooms and lots of 
occupants but too few doorways, stairwells and communal spaces – and 
then there’s the noise from the neighbours and a nagging anxiety about the 
foundations. This invites another qualification because the neighbours (other 
disciplines) issue invitations and come to visit, so that the ‘openness to fresh 
thinking’ is not confined to human geography; it is widely acknowledged that 
no one field, perspective or approach can ask all the important questions or 
provide all the interesting answers. What we find particularly encouraging is 
the reciprocity contained in the metaphor of invitation and visit. Where human 
geographers once borrowed freely from others in a one-directional series of 
appropriations, their work is now taken up – and taken seriously – elsewhere. 
Today, creative human geography is practised outside Human Geography 
as well as inside, and much of it in concert with scholars in other fields as 
well as with artists, photographers, film-makers, playwrights and journalists.2 
This openness is common to all intellectually alive disciplines; the borders 
between them are no longer policed with the same vigour that obtained thirty 
years ago. It is perfectly true that all of this busy intellectual commerce and 
trafficking has put a strain on the foundations but, again, this is not confined to 
human geography and, as we will see, there are reasons for suspecting that 
the old foundations provided little more than an illusion of stability and secu-
rity. Like many other disciplines, human geography is now guided by other, 
less structural metaphors that provide for a much more fluid and lively sense 
of inquiry.
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We have organised these volumes and our introductory essay as four 
loose but powerful themes that run throughout human geography: ‘Histories, 
philosophies and politics’; ‘Theories, methods and practices’; ‘Space, place 
and landscape; and ‘Nature, environment and the non-human’. These are 
not rigid categories and it is important to notice the resonances, references 
and the counter-arguments that flow back and forth between them. We hope 
that readers will find the result exciting, edifying and even surprising. We 
hope too that those who, like us, have been involved in the field for many 
years will find new things to think about, while those unfamiliar with human 
geography will be able to use these selections as springboards for their own 
intellectual journeys.
Histories, Philosophies and Politics
Re-telling Geography’s Story
The history of geography involves many stories that start at different times in 
different places; they slowly become intertwined, and their narrative threads 
can be unpicked and rewoven into many different designs. It is important to 
keep this image in mind because there is no one History (with that imperial 
capital H) of geography, and intellectual historians have chosen different 
starting-points for their stories: the traditions of chorography and geography 
in the classical world; their successor projects, the ‘special’ and ‘general’ geog-
raphies of early modern Europe; the modern discipline that comes into view 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries on both sides of the Atlantic; 
and the ‘new geographies’ that emerged during and after the Second World 
War.3 Remarkably, and regrettably, few historians have been interested in 
the worlds beyond the Atlantic until Europe reached out to explore, occupy 
and often devastate them. Those processes of colonialism and imperialism 
relied on and resulted in various geographical knowledges, of course, and 
the emergence of a postcolonial critique in human geography has helped 
recover some of those appropriations and erasures. And yet there has been far 
too little effort made to recover (for example) older Arab, Chinese or Indian 
traditions of geography.
This reminds us that there is no one Geography (with its own imperial 
capital G) either. Most orthodox histories of geographical inquiry have been 
directed towards its institutionalisation and formalisation, in which moments 
are clipped together like magnets until the present becomes the climax of the 
past, a ‘proper’ discipline that erases earlier mistakes and eclipses previous 
experiments. Geography is made to appear as the logical result of Science 
vanquishing fantasy and Reason triumphing over superstition, finally taking 
the place that had been allotted to it within the intellectual landscape. This is 
an odd sort of history as well as a dull one: courses in geography were taught 
in universities long before the modern creation of separate ‘disciplines’, and 
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many of the figures usually placed on pedestals as the principal architects of 
modern Geography displayed an intellectual range that was rarely bounded 
by a single field of expertise or interest. Consider a man like Alexander von 
Humboldt, who intended to join Napoleon’s military expedition to Egypt in 
1798 as a scientific observer but missed the boat and travelled to Spain’s 
colonies in central and South America instead: his 30-volume account of his 
travels ranged from botany and zoology to history and political economy, 
and his magnum opus, Cosmos, promised nothing less than ‘a sketch of the 
physical description of the universe’. Orthodox histories are inadequate for 
another reason: they provide ‘internalist’ narratives that focus on the inside 
of intellectual inquiry and rarely look at its outside, let alone wonder about 
the boundary between the two. Although they usually pay some attention to 
biography they are remarkably disinterested in history, in the wider currents 
in which Humboldt (and all the others) were caught up. There are important 
debates about the relations between knowledge and society, and while most 
writers would agree that these are not purely matters of choice, how they 
are to be theorised and analysed remains an open question.4 But it is hard to 
imagine making much sense of – or stimulating much interest in – the work 
of previous scholars without taking these debates, and the connections that 
they identify, with all possible seriousness. So it is reassuring to notice that 
those orthodox, cloistered histories have been unsettled by two moves. The 
first involves re-territorialising geography, and the second de-territorialising 
geography, and we need to think about each of them in turn.
To re-territorialise geography is to see geographical inquiry not as the 
progressive realisation of disembodied Reason but as the continuing product 
of shifting networks of social practices. This literally makes geography come 
alive: it means filling its pages with people who exist beyond the text, flesh 
and blood characters who animate intellectual inquiry as something more 
than a purely contemplative pursuit, sometimes competitive, at others col-
laborative (and usually both at the same time). Universities have never been 
ivory towers; they have always been caught up in the societies in which they 
are embedded. Scholars respond to events and situations in different ways, 
sometimes swept along by the tides of history, sometimes riding the waves 
(or commanding the tides to retreat), but almost always involved. This doesn’t 
mean that we can reduce a text to its context, but it does require us to think 
about the ways in which discoveries, ideas and claims emerge out of particu-
lar situations. This isn’t confined to Geography, of course, but the realisation 
that all knowledge is situated – that it is produced or reworked by somebody 
from somewhere – has an obvious special significance for a field that attaches 
so much importance to place and space. Human geographers have started 
to examine the different sites at which geographical knowledges have been 
produced – field sites, laboratories, libraries, archives, museums and a host 
of others – and the reciprocal relationships between these spaces and the 
social practices of knowledge production that take place there.5 None of this 
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need make geographical knowledge parochial; it may be marked in all sorts of 
ways by context and circumstance, but knowledges do travel – sometimes 
aggressively, under the banners of colonialism and imperialism, sometimes in 
a spirit of collaboration or solidarity – and they rarely survive the journey 
intact. They are examined on arrival, re-made and put to work in different 
contexts and different circumstances. In short, there is always a restlessness 
to our knowledge of the world. It may settle for a time in places where it 
is stored – hence the importance of libraries, archives and what are sometimes 
called ‘centres of calculation’ – but it is also usually mobile, especially in our 
liquid world, moving through changing circuits and pathways, sometimes 
openly, and sometimes furtively.
Once we start to think about knowledge like this, it’s really a small step to 
de-territorialise geography and to release the history of geographical know-
ledge from the confines of any one discipline. Geographical knowledge has 
always been produced at multiple sites and circulated through multiple net-
works.6 Some of this is more or less formal. The list of organisations that keep 
an eye on the world as part of their standard operating procedure is endless. 
The United Nations, the World Bank and NATO; departments of government, 
militaries and intelligence agencies; major oil companies, banks and trans-
national corporations; non-governmental organisations like Human Rights 
Watch, Oxfam and Save the Children; print, TV and online news organisa-
tions: they are all producers and consumers of geographical knowledge. But 
this can be expressed in other, less ‘data-driven’ forms too. Advertisements, 
art, film, literature, magazines, music, video: all of these are media through 
which other imaginative geographies are created that shape our sense of places 
and people around the world. ‘Academic’ geography spirals in and out of all 
those sites and networks too, so that the production of geography is, by its 
very nature, all over the place.
And yet some knowledges are typically privileged while others are mar-
ginalised or even ignored. Sometimes this is a matter of style rather than 
substance: for example, research in spatial statistics may be seen as central 
to geographical inquiry by some practitioners, while travel-writing may be 
rejected as the impressionistic work of the amateur. Sometimes, and rarely 
unconnected, it is a matter of what is called ‘positionality’: for example, 
indigenous or subaltern knowledges are often discounted in order to pro-
mote particular versions of ‘Science’ or ‘Development’. And sometimes texts 
are cast as heroes or villains. The standard accounts of human geography in 
the English-speaking world today usually measure their distance from two 
milestones (or millstones): Richard Hartshorne’s The nature of geography 
(1939) and David Harvey’s Explanation in Geography (1969), and we need 
to consider each in turn.
Hartshorne was an American political geographer who had left the United 
States in July 1938 for Germany, intending to spend his sabbatical leave 
studying the political geography of the Danube Basin. But his plans were 
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thrown into disarray by Hitler’s geopolitical ambitions. Hartshorne arrived 
four months after Nazi Germany had annexed Austria as part of the Third 
Reich, and he retreated to the library at the University of Vienna to complete 
a draft historical-cum-philosophical essay that he had taken with him. This 
grew into a major book that offered a rigorous prescription for Geography as 
a discipline.7 It is of interest for four reasons. First, Hartshorne’s history of 
geography was ruthlessly selective: he was determined to establish a continu-
ous intellectual tradition – what he called geography’s ‘continuity of life’ – 
that would at once identify the legitimate line of intellectual descent (so that 
professional geographers could ‘keep on the track’) and renounce its bastard 
children: ‘deviations from the course of historical development.’ His was not 
a disinterested history, then, but history with a purpose, a normative his-
tory. In Hartshorne’s telling it was a story that privileged German writers. 
One of his heroes, Alfred Hettner, had declared that ‘Geography is a German 
science’, and Hartshorne readily agreed: ‘the foundation of geography as a 
modern science was primarily the work of German students.’ Other stories 
are possible, but many of those written after Hartshorne (and often against 
him) still insisted that modern Geography had its origins as a distinctively 
European science.8 Second, Hartshorne’s purpose was to confirm Geography 
as a distinctive discipline, different from (say) Botany or Geology, Economics 
or Sociology. He drew on a distinction made by the philosopher Immanuel 
Kant between ‘logical classifications’, which direct our attention to formal or 
functional similarities between things, and ‘physical classifications’ that direct 
our attention to the co-existence of things in time or space. In Hartshorne’s 
view, logical classifications formed the basis for the systematic sciences, which 
included Biology and Geology, Economics and Sociology, while physical clas-
sifications were the foundation for what he saw as the ‘exceptional sciences’ of 
History and Geography. The unique object of geographical inquiry was thus 
the region, the assemblage of things found together in the same space, and the 
discipline’s task was to account for the differences between one region and 
another, which Hartshorne called ‘areal differentiation’.
This is routine stuff for histories of Geography, but it begs a critical 
question, and this is the third reason why his work is significant: given the 
circumstances in which Hartshorne set out these ideas, how on earth was it 
possible for a political geographer (of all people) to withdraw so completely 
into the world of books – and to reduce Geography to a succession of texts – 
whose pages were unmarked by the monstrous events taking place all around 
him? There is little doubt that Hartshorne was deeply affected by what he 
saw; he wrote of his good fortune in conversing regularly with a professor at 
the Geographical Institute in Vienna who ‘was permitted to do research but 
not to teach’ because his wife was Jewish, and recorded their fundamental 
agreement over ‘basic political and human issues in the irrational world of 
Nazi Germany.’ And he was certainly not indifferent to the rise of fascism; in 
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1941 Hartshorne was summoned to Washington to form a Geography section 
in what would eventually become the Office of Strategic Services, supervis-
ing the production of vital intelligence for the war against the Reich and its 
allies.9 The clue is in the word ‘irrational’. Hartshorne turned away from the 
desperately contested, acutely physical borders between states in a Europe 
on the brink of war to plot ones that were idyllic and imaginary: borders 
between disciplines that would reveal an enduring rational order in a world 
rapidly descending into madness. In doing so, Hartshorne not only declared 
his belief in Geography as a pure, objective Science but also his faith in a radi-
cally different German intellectual tradition to the debased fantasies being 
peddled by the Nazis. If this interpretation can be sustained, then it confirms 
that texts cannot be reduced their context in any simple or direct fashion. In 
this case, the context in which Hartshorne sketched out his ideas is present 
in the text through its absence.
There is a fourth reason for returning to Hartshorne’s work. Thirty years 
later The Nature of Geography was the object of Harvey’s critique in Explan-
ation in Geography.10 Others had disagreed with Hartshorne before, notably 
the American cultural geographer Carl Sauer who had objected to the barriers 
Hartshorne installed between history and geography. To Sauer this was the 
‘Great Retreat’, and the hybrid ‘historical geography’ was not a mutant but 
a vital mode of inquiry. Harvey would not have disagreed since he had been 
trained as an historical geographer. But like many others of his generation he 
rejected the view, which was common to both Hartshorne and Sauer (though 
in different ways), that the distinctiveness of geography was to be found out-
side the mainstream scientific tradition. Rather than turn to a disciplinary 
history to provide his warrant – not least because he was part of a movement 
that sought to break with the discipline’s past: the so-called ‘Quantitative 
Revolution’ – Harvey turned to Philosophy and specifically the philosophy of 
science. In his view, a properly scientific geography had to use ‘the standard 
model of scientific explanation’ derived from the physical sciences. Its distinc-
tive object would be (planetary) space not the region – Harvey insisted that 
space was ‘the central concept on which Geography as a discipline relies for 
its coherence’ – and its distinctive method would then be spatial analysis. In 
fact, Hartshorne had also described Geography as a ‘spatial science’, but his 
was a remarkably limited conception that treated each region as unique and 
required it to be analysed through an idiographic approach that promised a 
full understanding (usually an inventory) of the elements assembled within 
each distinctive regional constellation. This ruled out the prospect of gener-
alisations, whereas Harvey’s contrary view was to insist on the active search 
for a spatial order – a ‘spatial structure’ – existing beneath all these surface 
variations that could then be explained through generative processes. Seen 
like this, Geography was to be a consciously theoretical project: in Harvey’s 
words, ‘By our theories you shall know us.’
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The backdrop to the Quantitative Revolution and Harvey’s summation of 
its philosophical basis was more than an argument about the direction of the 
discipline. The 1960s were a time of principled social protest on both sides of 
the Atlantic: civil rights marches in the United States, rallies and demonstra-
tions against the Vietnam War, struggles for political freedoms behind the Iron 
Curtain, student demonstrations and sit-ins across Europe and the Americas, 
the anti-apartheid campaign, the rise of the environmental movement, the 
continuing march of the women’s liberation movement, and the rise of the gay 
rights movement. As Explanation in Geography appeared in print at the very 
end of that turbulent decade, Harvey moved from Britain to the United States 
where he embarked on a determined attempt to bring about what he would 
later call a (new) ‘revolution in geographical thought’. Dismayed by what he 
now saw as the poverty of spatial science, he criticised the ‘clear disparity 
between the sophisticated theoretical and methodological frameworks we are 
using and our ability to say anything really meaningful about events as they 
unfold around us.’ This was a bold challenge to both the ‘objectivity’ demanded 
by Hartshorne and the objectivism of spatial science. Instead, Harvey proposed 
a radically new, politically engaged human geography. The project was new 
partly because it was an activist rather than merely an ‘applied’ geography; 
spatial science had forged all sorts of links between human geography and 
urban and regional planning but these were largely instrumental, ‘expert 
knowledges’ that were directed at policy rather than politics. It was new too 
because Harvey sought its foundation in historical materialism, which he 
claimed provided not only the analytical depth missing from spatial science but 
also a spur to political action. The radical geography he advertised in Social 
Justice and the city (1973) was not a purist philosophical venture: as Karl Marx 
insisted – the sentiment is engraved on his tombstone – ‘philosophers have 
only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.’ Harvey’s 
early engagements with classical Marxism were exuberant but unformed, and 
he would devote the rest of his career to a closer reading of Marx and to the 
construction of what he came to call historico-geographical materialism.11 As 
this suggests, space remained one of his central concerns, but it was now con-
ceived in a different way: if, as Marx argued, capitalism should be theorised 
as a mode of production then it was essential to see that it produced not only 
commodities but also space.
Philosophies and Politics
We will return to these claims later. For now, Harvey’s trajectory provides a 
template to gauge two other important developments. First, not all human 
geographers shared his impatience with philosophical exploration. Many of 
them endorsed his critique of spatial science but suspected that the root of the 
problem was the philosophy of science on which the Quantitative Revolution 
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appeared to rest: positivism. This was perhaps premature; few of those who 
developed its first- or even second-generation spatial models and dreamed 
of what Peter Haggett, another British geographer, once called ‘a general 
theory of locational relativity’ had been much interested in philosophy, and 
Harvey’s attempt to provide a philosophical warrant for Explanation in Geog-
raphy had come late in the day. In fact, ‘positivism’ didn’t even appear in the 
index. But there was more than a family resemblance between spatial science 
and positivism: the privilege given to empirical observations (‘the facts’); 
the obsession with hypothesis testing; the search for an order of things that 
could be enshrined in general laws that in principle could even unite physical 
and human geography; and the belief in neutral, value-free inquiry. Each of 
these could be challenged, and – like many social sciences – human geography 
was soon caught up in a sustained exploration of post-positivist philosophies. 
There was a dazzling parade of –isms and –ologies through the discipline, each 
one accompanied by a considerable fanfare. The largest crowds were attracted 
by phenomenology, (critical) realism, structuralism and post-structuralism. 
The only one of these that retained an affiliation with something approaching 
‘the scientific method’, or at least one that would be recognised by physical 
scientists, was realism. Most of its architects were philosophers of science, 
and its emphasis on providing causal explanations (rather than establishing 
correlations) gave a new impetus to empirical work in many areas of human 
geography.12 In some of its forms phenomenology also had a close relation to 
science, in so far as it sought to criticise science’s ‘natural attitude’ in order 
to disclose the way in which the objects of its inquiries were brought into view. 
In doing so, however, it ranged far beyond the natural sciences and the social 
sciences that aped them; so too, in different ways, did structuralism and 
post-structuralism.
In human geography most of these philosophies (the exception is the 
cluster of approaches grouped under post-structuralism) were used, as often 
as not, to replace one foundationalism – positivism – with another. In other 
words, they sought to establish a secure and certain foundation for claims 
to knowledge. The cardinal assumption was that Philosophy, what American 
philosopher Richard Rorty called ‘Philosophy-with-a-capital-P’, occupied a 
special vantage point from which to lay down the rules and issue instructions 
for the conduct of substantive inquiries to be carried out by underlabourers 
in other fields. Rorty was deeply sceptical about this assumption (in fact, he 
was wonderfully rude about it). Of course, Philosophers are not the only pre-
tenders to the throne, and Rorty also listed the Party, Priests, Physicists and 
Poets, all surrogates for larger political and cultural formations. Harvey, for all 
his impatience with philosophising, retains a strong faith in foundationalism 
and repeatedly distinguishes the ‘surface appearance’, ‘froth’ and disorder of 
things from the invariant laws and logics of capital accumulation that drive 
those transformations. But Rorty was a philosopher and so he took Philosophy 
as his exemplar. In his view, Philosophy can never provide a single, canonical 
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language into which all questions can be translated and in whose terms all 
disputes can be resolved. Those who think it can, he said, simply fail to take 
language seriously. Feminist scholar Donna Haraway  – whose first book was 
on metaphors in twentieth-century biology and who evidently takes science 
rather more seriously than Rorty – agrees. In one of her most celebrated 
essays she calls this ‘the God-trick’, the claim to see everything from nowhere 
in particular. What it conveniently ignores, she argues, is the worldliness of 
intellectual inquiry: the fact that all knowledge is situated, so that there is no 
position from which to freely and fully observe the world in all its complex 
particulars. All our knowledges provide partial perspectives, and acknowledg-
ing this is not a barrier to objectivity but the very condition of it because only 
then, through dialogue with others, can we start to understand how limited 
our own views are.13
Rorty and Haraway are helpful guides, because they suggest why the 
relationship between philosophy and geography slowly changed. At least 
since Hartshorne the modern terms of exchange had enforced a monologue 
in which Philosophy dictated and Geography obeyed, but this has given way 
to something much more like a conversation. Today philosophy is increasingly 
treated as resource rather than writ, used to inform rather than police inquiry. 
The parade of –isms and –ologies has been dismissed, to be replaced by an 
interest in the writings of particular philosophers whose interventions spiral 
far beyond the philosophy of science to address urgent questions of political 
and moral philosophy. Indeed, the work of philosophers like Giorgio Agamben, 
Alain Badiou, Judith Butler, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida or Michel Foucault 
spirals far beyond philosophy too, and human geographers have found in their 
writings inspiration for their own investigations of the human and the non-
human, subjectivity and spatiality, power and violence, gender and sexuality 
and a host of other substantive issues. At its best, this is not about ‘applying’ 
their insights but reading their texts at once closely and creatively.
We may seem to have travelled far from Harvey’s corpus, but in fact we 
have circled back to it because a second development from the baseline of 
Social justice and the city, which the engagement with political and moral 
philosophy illustrates, has been to widen the political and ethical address 
of human geography.14 Harvey’s project has been animated, above all, by a 
strong sense of class politics, and although he has addressed other axes of 
oppression and discrimination these have always been secondary. But other 
human geographers have insisted that there are multiple forms of injustice 
that cannot be reduced to class or convened within the plenary discourse of 
historical or even historico-geographical materialism. Two braiding streams 
of research are particularly important: feminist geography and postcolonial 
geography, both influenced by various forms of post-structural thought. We 
now have a far richer understanding of the ways in which race, gender and 
sexuality are embedded in and reproduced through places and landscapes, 
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but feminist geography and postcolonial geography have also shown how 
discriminations are reproduced in – and legitimated through – geographical 
knowledges. Feminist geographies have posed a major challenge to the assump-
tion that knowledge claims derive their authority from being universal and 
somehow gender-free; they have shown to the contrary that conventions 
and concepts, theories and methods – the working practices of the academy and 
most other sites of knowledge production at large – have worked to advance 
particular, gendered ways of knowing (and being in) the world. These have 
typically privileged a highly restricted model of the masculine and used it 
to regulate – in fact to authenticate – what counts as reliable, acceptable or 
professional work.15
The various geographies written under the sign of colonialism have not 
been free from masculinism – think of the hideous ideology of ‘the white man’s 
burden’ – but their special effect has been to privilege the powers and know-
ledges that accrued to what today would be called the global North.16 During 
the long history of European colonialism and imperialism what Felix Driver 
calls ‘geography militant’ functioned not only in a directly practical sense to 
advance occupation, dispossession and appropriation – surveying territories, 
compiling resource inventories and the like – but also in an epistemological 
sense to situate ‘Europe’ at the centre of the advance of rational knowledge. If 
modern Geography was indeed a European science, as many of its historians 
claim, it was also a profoundly Eurocentric one.17 Eurocentrism was never 
a static enterprise, and in the course of the long twentieth century it was 
transformed into a sort of ‘Euro-Americanism’ that will surely be disrupted 
though not necessarily displaced by the resurgence of Asia in the twenty-first 
century. But even before it assumed today’s hyphenated form, Eurocentrism 
was divided internally (so that British, French and German colonialisms 
were distinct and rival enterprises, for example) and it assumed different 
forms in different places. One of its most pervasive and pernicious versions was 
Orientalism, in which European and later American politicians and generals, 
writers and artists constructed ‘the Orient’ as at once an exotic and bizarre 
space, at the limit a monstrous and pathological space – what Edward Said 
famously called ‘a living tableau of queerness’ – and as a space that had to 
be domesticated, disciplined and normalized – straightened out – through a 
forceful (imperial) imposition of the order it was supposed to lack: ‘framed 
by the classroom, the criminal court, the prison, the illustrated manual.’18 
Again, this matrix was infinitely divisible: there were multiple ‘Orients’, from 
the ‘Near East’ and the ‘Middle East’ to the ‘Far East’. Other places and other 
peoples were the subject of other imaginative geographies, notably primitiv-
ism and savagism for indigenous peoples in sub-Saharan Africa, the Americas 
and the Pacific archipelago. Other natures were also enrolled in the project, and 
both scientific and non-scientific discourses (including art and travel writing) 
worked to normalise temperate nature as ‘normal’ nature: ‘all that is modest, 
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civilized, cultivated’. In particular, the discourse of tropicality constructed 
‘the tropics’ as a paradise of excess and abundance, a veritable Garden of 
Eden, or as a rotting, fallen nature: the distance between Gauguin’s Tahiti and 
Conrad’s Congo.19 Here, as is so often the case, talking about ‘nature’ was also 
a way of talking about ‘culture’.
None of these constructions are creatures of the past: Orientalism helped 
to shape British geographer-politician Halford Mackinder’s imperial vision of 
a ‘heartland’ in the early twentieth century, and it was reactivated in stun-
ningly violent ways in the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere that were 
launched in the shadows of 9/11.20 None of them is confined to human geog-
raphy either, but feminist and postcolonial geographies, in addition to their 
other, vital contributions, draw our attention to the ways in which assump-
tions about what is normal – ‘universal’ – have been smuggled into our field 
to normalise a particular (and particularly limited) conception of the ‘human’ 
in human geography. The challenge is to recognise and resist the ways in 
which those assumptions also diminish everyday lives inside and outside the 
classroom and the lecture theatre.21
In enlarging its sense of the human in these and other ways, human 
geography has moved into an interdisciplinary space, which is where most 
disciplines now find themselves. This has perplexed some writers, however, 
who have returned to the quest for a disciplinary identity. This is, in part, a 
response to the changes that have taken place in post-secondary education 
and advanced research under contemporary neo-liberalism. In the not very 
brave new world of the modern corporate university the commitments of a 
critical human geography (like those of other disciplines) are put under a 
microscope whose lenses have been cut to reveal a highly particular vision 
of knowledge. Accountability contracts to accountancy, politics to policy, 
and the very idea of critique (except in the ultimately empty and supposedly 
marketable form of ‘critical thinking’) all but disappears. Once hailed, by 
geographers at any rate, as Geography’s strength – its multiple allegiances to 
the sciences, social sciences and humanities – threatens to become a liability. 
If physical and human geographies look outwards and rarely at each other, 
physical geography to the earth, ocean and atmospheric sciences and to the 
biological sciences, and human geography to philosophy, political economy, 
sociology, history and literature, the administrative-cum-fiscal temptation to 
‘rationalise’ and re-brand is not always easy to resist. Geography may not be 
coming apart at the seams, as Ron Johnston once feared, but there are always 
willing fingers prepared to unpick the stitches from the outside.22
But the renewed debate over the nature of Geography – conducted in terms 
that Hartshorne would surely have enormous difficulty in recognising – is 
also driven by the sheer range of its inquiries and the demands placed upon 
its students by the theories, methods and practices that these involve. It is to 
these that we now turn.
Editors’ Introduction xxxvii
Theories, Methods and Practices
Revolution and Transformations in Geography
Many writers have argued that the ‘Quantitative Revolution’ of the 1960s 
is better understood as a theoretical revolution. For them, its most signifi-
cant and perhaps even lasting contribution was the emphasis it placed on 
theoretical work in contrast to the fact-grubbing geographies of the past: 
the regional inventories that were the ever-present corollary of Hartshorne’s 
problematic of areal differentiation. The contrast is real enough, even if his 
critics would be surprised to learn that Hartshorne himself acknowledged the 
significance of select studies in location theory, including J.H. von Thünen’s 
model of agricultural land use (in fact not so surprising in an exegesis of a 
German intellectual tradition, since German scholars had been prominent 
in the development of location theory). But it was never part of his vision of 
Geography as what he called, only in passing and in relation to astronomy, 
‘a spatial science’. After the Second World War the most advanced work in 
human geography was increasingly concerned with the development and sub-
stantiation of formal theory, notably central place theory and general models 
of the space-economy (Walter Christaller, August Lösch), industrial location 
theory (Alfred Weber), diffusion theory (Torsten Hägerstrand) and theories of 
urban residential structure (E.W. Burgess and Homer Hoyt).23 These avowedly 
‘scientific’ investigations were not peculiarly geographical preoccupations; 
all the social sciences were re-shaped by their service in the war, and the Cold 
War continued to influence and often to fund academic research.24 In Geog-
raphy, however, this was a sea change that repudiated Hartshorne’s prospectus 
and replaced it with a self-consciously ‘new’ and emphatically modern geog-
raphy. There was a degree of irony in this, because most of the theoretical 
bases for spatial science could be traced back to the pre-war years; the only 
exception in the list above is Hägerstrand (and even then much of his data 
came from the 1920s and 30s). The seductive post-war gloss was applied 
through new means of computation – including computers themselves, and 
also new modes of analysis including operations research – that were cre-
ated or transformed during the war and considerably expanded the scope of 
mathematical and statistical analysis.25
For many of those most closely involved in spatial science, it seems that 
quantitative methods were always a means to an end. They were seen as 
highly rigorous – a way of putting ‘the’ scientific method into practice – but 
also wonderfully suggestive. For if human geography was now about the search 
for spatial order, it was clear that spatial order was not immediately apparent 
to the casual observer but would have to be ferreted out using spatial statistics 
in an almost forensic fashion.26 En route, however, some human geographers 
undoubtedly became so fascinated that they mistook the means for the end. 
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They successfully alerted their colleagues to a central dilemma of standard 
statistical inference, which assumes that observations are independent from 
one another – the search for spatial order is predicated on spatial depend-
ence, which means that this assumption is violated in the domains of most 
geographical interest – and in doing so made major contributions to the math-
ematics of spatial autocorrelation.27 But whether these technical achievements 
increased the explanatory power of available spatial theories was another 
matter entirely. And it was theoretical power that was supposed to be decisive: 
remember Harvey’s injunction, ‘By our theories you shall know us.’ This was 
at once an argument about the distinctiveness of geography – although what 
a purely ‘geographical’ theory might be remained unanswered – and about 
the elevation of theory over method: hence the retrospective re-coding of the 
Quantitative Revolution as a theoretical revolution.
But we need to add two riders to this reading, one about quantitative 
methods and the other about theory itself. In human geography the excesses of 
spatial modelling, which were most visible in the various point-process models 
(Poisson, negative binomial and the rest) that were used to generate spatial 
patterns and distance-decay curves, resulted in a growing conviction that, as 
Gunnar Olsson put it, ‘our statements often reveal more about the language 
we are talking in than the things we are talking about.’ Like Harvey, Olsson had 
been part of the avant-garde of spatial science, but the two friends were now 
drawing a distinction (in different ways) between the abstract regularity of 
spatial form – the isotropic planes and hexagonal grids of spatial science – and 
the turbulent dialectics of social process. ‘In the realm of intentions, hopes 
and fears,’ Olsson warned, ‘two times two is not always equal to four.’28 In his 
case, unlike Harvey’s, the argument was driven by a continuing, astonishingly 
creative engagement with philosophy, but the narrower, more sober-sided cri-
tique of positivism licensed a general and no doubt premature withdrawal 
from quantitative methods altogether by many human geographers. It was 
also reinforced by Harvey’s own, highly influential transition ‘from models to 
Marx’ and by the development of a range of other critical geographies that 
affirmed their distance from spatial analysis.29 The newfound interest in human 
agency and the human subject seemed to demand radically other skills and 
sensibilities. The collective turn to all manner of qualitative methods proved 
remarkably fruitful (though these could not escape their Cold War shadows 
either) and explorations of ethnography, textual analysis and other interpreta-
tive approaches did much to re-humanise and radicalise a human geography 
that had become virtually eviscerated.30 But the use of quantitative methods 
is not a diagnostic test for positivism, and the inability to interrogate large, 
complex datasets and tease out the relationships within them runs the risk of 
blunting the critical force of human geography.31 There is a crucial, recipro-
cal relationship between theory and data – as even hard-core social science 
approaches like EITM (Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models) recognise – 
and most human geographers would now probably agree that it is actively 
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unhelpful to oppose quantitative and qualitative methods or to see GIS as 
the work of the devil.32 But they would also insist that the sources and media 
with which they work are not limited to ‘data’.
The situation is further complicated by changes in the theory used in 
human geography. For the most part standard location theory relied on a 
mix of psychology and economic theory – ideas about economic rationality 
and price signals, supply and demand schedules, and equilibrating markets – 
complemented (or confounded) by elementary theses about the ‘friction of 
distance’. The critique of spatial science had many sources, but some of the 
earliest and most penetrating arguments took direct aim at its economic base 
by drawing upon radical political economy. These focused attention on cap-
ital accumulation and crisis formation, on the intersections between labour 
markets and housing markets, and on global processes of combined and 
uneven development that together established a problematic centred on the 
production of space under capitalism. As the agenda for critical human geog-
raphy gradually became more extensive, however, other theoretical resources 
were tapped, and a second wave crested under the impetus of modern social 
theory.33 Much of this was directed at explicating modalities of power that 
reached beyond the economic sphere – its sites included the state, the com-
munity and the family – but it too sought to elucidate the intrinsic spatiality 
of social life.34 This second wave was not independent from the first – it was, 
in part, a critical response to it, but there was also a tradition of ‘Western 
Marxism’ that sought to extend historical materialism beyond the economic 
preoccupations of Marx and Engels, and human geographers discovered that 
Walter Benjamin, Guy Debord, Jürgen Habermas, Frederic Jameson, Henri 
Lefebvre, Nicos Poulantzas and a host of other writers had much to teach 
them – but the object of inquiry was now not only capitalism and its trans-
formations (capitalism was a moving target: hence the distinctions between 
industrial capitalism and finance capitalism and, later, between Fordism and 
post-Fordism) but more insistently capitalist modernity and, eventually, the 
putative formation of the ‘post-modern’. Here too there was what Edward Soja 
called a powerful ‘reassertion of space in social theory’.35
Both the first and second waves relied on theories that were markedly 
different from those of spatial science because, unlike the frozen lattices and 
equilibrium worlds of those early models, they described geographies in con-
stant motion, where (as Marx put it) ‘all that is solid melts into air’ and where 
the contemporary ‘space of flows’ springs from a ‘liquid’ modernity. And yet, 
like spatial science, they were all marked by an extraordinary, almost imperial 
ambition. This was true in the more or less literal sense that these were all 
still Euro-American theories put to work to make sense of human geographies 
everywhere – there was still too little interest in what David Slater called 
‘learning from other regions’36 – but they were also often so many versions 
of what is sometimes called Grand Theory. This was partly a matter of range, 
an architectonic impulse to construct a conceptual system that can reveal 
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the central generating mechanisms that produce the (dis)order of things, and 
partly a matter of style, an epistemological desire to master the world and 
domesticate its differences. Seen like this, these theoretical preoccupations 
and privileges became vulnerable to critiques from both feminism and post-
colonialism.37 In response, the advocates of postmodernism protested that their 
work displayed an acute sensitivity to difference – hence Michael Dear’s insist-
ence that ‘there can be no grand theory for human geography!’38 – and that their 
research programme could rehabilitate ‘areal differentiation’ in a theoretic-
ally informed and politically charged fashion. But to many critics it was just 
that – fashion (or worse) – and Cindi Katz issued an eloquent plea for theory 
in a minor key that would refuse the theoretical allegiances demanded by such 
grandiose schemes and work instead in the awkward spaces-in-between dif-
ferent traditions. There would be no grand synthesis, no totalising vision, only 
the constant effort to understand and, where necessary, to un-do.39 Similarly – 
but differently – Nigel Thrift argued that a more ‘modest’ form of theorising 
was necessary for human geography to avoid a ‘theory-centred’ style of research 
‘which continually avoids the taint of particularity’, though several critics 
evidently regard his non-representational theory as another exorbitation of 
Theory (and a radical diminution of its political possibility).40
In the course of these exchanges about method and theory another change 
came into view. Human geography had been one of the last fields in the 
English-speaking world to take Marx seriously (in contrast, for example, to 
Francophone geography). Many human geographers were excited by the 
prospect of deeper theorisations of the capitalist space-economy, and there 
was a considerable interest in the structural logics – what Harvey sometimes 
called the ‘laws’ – of the contemporary capitalist mode of production. Other 
human geographers were attracted by the historical sensibility of what was, 
after all, historical materialism, and their analysis of processes and dynamics 
was driven less by formal theory and more by the particularities of archival 
research. Political-economic theory flourished in a host of different forms, 
from regulation theory through analytical Marxism and beyond, but so too did 
an ostensibly more traditional cultural-historical scholarship inspired by the 
work of historian E.P. Thompson and cultural critic Raymond Williams. This 
too was theoretically informed and had affinities with some versions of social 
theory – when Thompson railed against ‘the poverty of Theory’ it was Grand 
Theory, and strictly speaking structural Marxism, that he had in his sights – 
but it was much closer to the humanities than to the social sciences. These 
currents flowed into a more general ‘humanistic geography’ that had many 
sources.41 Some of its practitioners were indifferent, even hostile to discussions 
of theory or method (and much more invested in philosophical speculation); 
their style was often particularistic but also individualistic, even idiosyncratic, 
and they relied as much on contemplation and reflection as analysis.42 Others 
were more analytical, and while they drew on social theory their work also 
harvested the resources of the arts and humanities.
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This had major consequences. These allied fields were as theoretical in 
their sensibilities as the social sciences, but they were not characterised by any 
theoretical dominant: human geographers developed a keen appreciation 
of Michel Foucault and Edward Said, Jacques Derrida and Terry Eagleton, 
Roslayn Deutsche and John Berger. These enthusiastic readings intensified 
the heterodox nature of human geography. They opened its doors not only 
to the general admission of post-structuralisms of various kinds but also to the 
particular contributions of art history, literary theory and psychoanalytic 
theory to the analysis of core concerns like landscape, place and identity. This 
in turn has sustained new cross-fertilisations between human geography and 
the humanities. Artists, historians and literary scholars (among others) have 
come to recognise the critical potential in the conceptual and technical con-
tributions of human geography – one recent collection even announces the 
emergence of the ‘geohumanities’43 – and the American literary theorist 
Stanley Fish, reviewing these developments, has argued that ‘the humanities 
have been the victors in the theory wars; nearly everyone now dances to their 
tune.’44 Not surprisingly, Fish emphasises the interplay ‘between a literary and 
a geographical vocabulary’, which has assuredly been important. It would be 
impossible to make sense of the conversations between human geography and 
(for example) postcolonial studies without a close reading of the contribu-
tions of literary scholars Edward Said, Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak.45 There is also a long and rather less theoretically informed history 
of human geographers fretting over what they used to call ‘the problem of 
geographical description’, which they understood as ‘the inherent difficulty 
of conveying a visual impression in a sequence of words’.46 But, as that remark 
makes clear, a key term passed over by Fish is the visual: and it is perhaps here 
that the exchanges between the (other) humanities disciplines and human 
geography have been most energising.
Envisioning Human Geography
The philosopher Martin Jay described vision as the ‘master sense of the 
modern era’ – the gendering of the gaze is not incidental – and metaphors of 
sight constantly surface in our claims to know something: the emphasis on 
observation, on evidence (from the Latin videre meaning ‘to see), and the com-
mon use of ‘I see’ when we mean ‘I understand’. Visualisation is also hidden in 
the word ‘theory’ itself, which combines the Greek thea (‘outward appearance’) 
and horao (‘to look closely’). These are general features, but many writers have 
identified a special affinity between visualisation and the working practices of 
modern geography. This intimacy has been scrutinised in projects as outwardly 
different as Mackinder’s geopolitics – with its purportedly disembodied and 
detached gaze47 – and spatial science, whose apprehension of ‘the world-as-
exhibition’ separates observer and observed to produce the ‘perspective’ that 
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is supposed to guarantee objectivity and order.48 Some of the liveliest inter-
ventions have focused on a number of human geography’s central concepts – 
like landscape, which we discuss in the next section49 – and on perhaps its 
most basic method: mapping.
Mapping is usually represented as a technical process, and the history of 
cartography as a journey from error (‘here be monsters’) to Truth. Seen like this, 
the modern map and the atlas become purely technical artefacts, the products 
of a carefully controlled and recognisably scientific process that combines 
topographical or geodetic survey with the mathematics of map projection. If 
the history of cartography was an invitation to measure – and marvel at – the 
accuracy and fidelity of the modern map, then reading the map was a tech-
nical exercise too, involving a knowledge of projections and scale, contours 
and symbols. The map itself was inert and innocent: you could read it or you 
couldn’t, and apart from the manipulations of so-called ‘propaganda maps’ it 
could serve multiple purposes, from bombing cities to rebuilding them. This 
state of grace was interrupted by two interventions. The first, like the other 
initial de-stabilising encounters with the humanities, was largely historical. In 
several seminal essays historical geographer J.B. Harley sought to subvert ‘the 
apparent naturalness and innocence of the world shown in maps’. He used a 
vivid series of historical vignettes to demonstrate the multiple ways in which 
maps were routinely enlisted in the service of political and economic power.50 
Harley’s arguments sparked a firestorm of controversy, but they also licensed a 
new, critical history of cartography that was much more aware of the ways in 
which cartographic ‘science’ was a vehicle for the promotion of interests and 
ideologies. In his quest to ‘deconstruct’ the map Harley invoked both Derrida 
and Foucault, but his real strengths lay in historical inquiry rather than con-
ceptual acrobatics, and even those who were sympathetic to his project (and 
there were many) remained sceptical about his theoretical gestures.
Partly in consequence, the second intervention was more rigorously 
theoretical but also, as it happened, directed squarely at the present rather 
than the past. This involved a searching interrogation of what was called 
‘cartographic reason’, which had two entailments. On one side maps fixed a 
capricious world and represented it as a stable and ordered totality, while on 
the other side they were ‘performative’ so that, under specified conditions, 
they had the power to produce the effects they named: mapping, wrote John 
Pickles, ‘even as it claimed to represent the world, produced it.’51 This may 
seem frustratingly abstract, but in William Boyd’s novel An Ice-Cream War 
there is a marvellous passage that speaks directly to these propositions. During 
the First World War a young English officer is posted to East Africa, where his 
regiment is ordered to attack a detachment of German colonial troops. The 
mission is meticulously planned on a map, but when he and his comrades 
plunge over the side of the troopship and wade ashore they find themselves in 
a terrifying, perplexing battle for which they were almost wholly unprepared. 
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‘Gabriel thought maps should be banned,’ Boyd writes; ‘they gave the world 
an order and a reasonableness which it didn’t possess.’ This is an instructive 
example because it also directs our attention beyond the map: ‘mapping’ is 
not something that lies wholly behind the map, the historical process that 
culminates in its production, because mapping is also ‘beyond’ the map, what 
happens every time we interact with and through a map.52 This shifts the 
focus from the map as a technical object or a cultural representation to maps 
as practices. Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge capture this change when they 
insist that ‘maps are of-the-moment, brought into being through practices 
(embodied, social, technical), always remade every time they are engaged 
with.’ On their reading, then, ‘maps are transitory and fleeting, being contin-
gent, relational and context-dependent.’ In short, ‘maps are practices – they 
are always mappings. . .’53 This realisation turns cartography into something 
more than a means of representation; it becomes a medium of critical, polit-
ical intervention. Human geographers, artists and others have collaborated 
in a range of projects – the Counter Cartographies Project, the Atlas of Radi-
cal Cartography and a host of others, many of them online – that continue 
and rework a tradition that can be traced back to the modernist cartographic 
experiments of the Situationists in the early twentieth century. What they 
have in common is the recognition that the map can be not only the object of 
critique but a means of critique.54
These developments have been closely aligned to human geography’s 
deepening engagements with other visual media – from those that have long 
been part of the modern geographical repertoire (photography, satellite and 
remotely sensed imagery) to those that have only more recently attracted the 
attention of human geographers (television, film, video)55 – and, in tandem, 
to the interest in what Gillian Rose calls ‘a critical visual methodology’ that 
‘thinks about the visual in terms of the cultural significance, social practices 
and power relations in which it is embedded.’56 Central to all of this has been 
a vital distinction between vision as a biological-physiological capacity – which 
naturalises vision – and visuality as a culturally or techno-culturally mediated 
way of seeing. This distinction does not reduce visualisation to techno-culture; 
on the contrary, questions of embodiment and corporeality – the refusal of the 
disembodied eye and the unmarked gaze – are focal to this way of thinking 
about human geographies. So too is the sociality of seeing, so that perspec-
tive, in its literal or metaphorical senses, is not the individual construction of 
an isolated observer.57
If seeing is no longer taken for granted, and human geography is now 
exploring different theories and different methods that can illuminate what 
happens through different visual practices, it is also clear that ‘seeing things 
differently’ is what all our theories and methods claim to do: they promise to 
disclose things we hadn’t seen before, to reveal relations and consequences 
we hadn’t noticed. This was the promise of spatial science and it remains at 
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the heart of critical human geography. The difference is that we now know 
that seeing is never innocent and, from Haraway and others, that there is 
no single point of overview – no Archimedean point – from which the world 
can be ‘objectively’ disclosed as a fully transparent space. If our theories and 
methods establish spaces of constructed visibility, these are also always spaces 
of constructed invisibility. The price of seeing this is not to see that. And yet 
most human geographers would be reluctant to limit their work to contem-
plation. Teaching and research are also ways of intervening in the world, 
of ‘making a difference’ or electing not to, and this activates another sense of 
vision: the image of a future and somehow better world, which requires us 
to think again about questions of theory, method and practice. Practice here 
carries a profoundly political and ethical charge. For if we do not care about 
the world – if we treat it as merely a screen on which to display our command 
of Technique or as a catalogue that furnishes examples of our Theory – we 
abandon any prospect of a genuinely human geography. We do not want to be 
misunderstood: of course theories and methods are important, but it is simply 
wrong to encounter the world and render it in such exorbitantly and exclu-
sively instrumental ways. Just like the extremists of spatial science, this is to 
mistake the means for the end.
Human geographers have made political and ethical interventions in a 
number of ways. ‘Applied geography’ has a long history, which has been trans-
formed through contracted research for private and public interests and the 
involvement of human geographers in the formulation and assessment of 
public policy. These are muddy waters; some practitioners have despaired at 
the abstract elaboration of Technique or Theory as a studied disengagement 
from the messiness of the world, while others have challenged the norma-
tive claims that are covertly advanced through the ‘application’ of techniques 
and theories.58 Here, as elsewhere, human geographers have to negotiate 
the various interests that shape their claims to ‘expert knowledge’.59 This has 
prompted some of them to work outside the privileged worlds of the state, 
the corporation or the think-tank, and to engage instead in research with non-
profit, non-governmental organisations and with disadvantaged or margin-
alised groups. They seek to lend their voice to those who are often denied a 
voice, but they also learn from them as well as about them in a collaborative, 
participatory process of making human geography.60 Others have preferred 
to engage in, even to provoke public debate about matters of urgent political, 
economic, social or environmental concern. At the start of the twenty-first 
century the President of the Association of American Geographers lamented 
that ‘critical geographical perspectives and idea are largely missing from public 
discussion of issues and events.’61 What a difference a decade makes. Human 
geographers are now actively involved in the production and circulation of 
‘public geographies’ that reach far beyond the academy and, in doing so, they 
are involved in the simultaneous production of the spaces and publics that 
compose the public sphere.62
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Space, Place and Landscape
Enlivening Space
The production of geographical knowledge has always involved claims to 
know terrestrial space in particular ways. Historically special importance 
was attached to the power to fix the locations of places, people and physical 
phenomena on the surface of the Earth and to represent these on maps. But, 
as we have just seen, the capacity to ‘write’ the earth in this way – the literal 
meaning of ‘Geo-graphy’ is ‘earth-writing’ – is not a purely technical affair 
because it is always implicated in the production of particular constellations 
of power. The relations between power, knowledge and geography animate 
contemporary discussions of a series of concepts, including place, landscape, 
region and territory, which have a direct bearing on how we understand 
the spatiality of life on Earth. Two general debates frame those more par-
ticular discussions.
First, several writers have treated the nineteenth century as the epoch of 
time and the twentieth century as the epoch of space. This could mean many 
things, but it has usually been taken to address imagination (an accent on time 
in the work of major nineteenth-century philosophers and artists, for example) 
and substance (an aggressive preoccupation with geopolitics in the twentieth 
century, for example). The contrast between the two can be traced to a remark 
Foucault made in a lecture in 1967 – ‘the great obsession of the nineteenth 
century was, as we know, history’, whereas ‘the present epoch will perhaps 
be above all the epoch of space’63 – and several commentators later claimed, 
with a confidence that one might have expected Foucault’s conditional ‘may’ 
to have qualified, that as the modern gave way to the postmodern so crit-
ical social theory was compelled to recognize (or, as Edward Soja preferred, 
to ‘reassert’) the intrinsic spatiality of social life. The distinction is decept-
ively simple; the high modernism of the 1950s and 60s, particularly in the 
United States, privileged change and transformation, and its functionalism 
planed away all local particularity, but the modernisms of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, especially in Europe, were by no means silent 
about space.64 Be that as it may, other writers have traded on global changes 
in communications and financial infrastructures to advance the opposite view, 
announcing the contemporary ‘death of distance’ and the imminent ‘end of 
geography’ in the same late, liquid or postmodern world: as Thomas Friedman 
put it in his ‘brief history of the twenty-first century’, ‘the world is flat’.65 This 
too is deceptively simple – in fact simply wrong – because it advances and 
celebrates a model of globalisation that ignores the constitutive relations 
between power and space.66 This group of writers has noticed the process that 
David Harvey calls time-space compression – echoing Marx’s account of the 
‘annihilation of space by time’ under capitalism – but failed to recognise its 
inherent variation: combined and uneven development is not an accidental 
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by-product of capitalism but rather inheres in the very structures through 
which it reproduces exaction and inequality.67 The ‘flattening’ of the world is 
about more than the almost frictionless mobility of capital, information and 
commodities, and the no less oiled movement of executives, tourists and even 
troops from the privileged zones of the global North. Mobility is differentiated, 
and elsewhere people are violently displaced by flood, famine and war: as 
Bhabha has it, ‘the globe shrinks for those who own it’, but ‘for the displaced or 
dispossessed, the migrant or refugee, no distance is greater or more awesome 
than the few feet across borders or frontiers.’68 Like Mark Twain’s, reports of 
the death of distance have been greatly exaggerated. William Gibson, who 
devised the term ‘cyberspace’in the 1980s and who has an acute awareness 
of the transformations Friedman and others fetishise, has often claimed that 
‘the future is here – it’s just not evenly distributed yet.’ The point has been 
sharpened by accounts of globalisation that are closely attuned to its powers 
of destruction as well as creation, and invested in elucidating its complex and 
compound geographies.69 In short, the debate over whether ‘space matters’ 
depends very much on how space is conceptualised.
The second debate follows directly from the first and concerns the ‘nature’ 
of space. Many writers inside and outside human geography have treated 
planetary space as either a framework within which social life happens or 
as the terrain on which human history unfolds. One represents space as an 
empty and unchanging grid of mutually exclusive points within which objects 
exist and events occur. This ‘absolute’ conception of space provided the basis 
for the system of areal differentiation that Hartshorne devised in The nature 
of geography, and its coordinate system is translated directly into the con-
ventional map. The other treats space as the physical stage for the drama of 
human history, in which geography is assigned the task of painting the scenery 
without being drawn into the action. When Paul Vidal de la Blache, one of the 
founders of the French school of human geography, protested that ‘the stage 
itself is alive’, he had in mind a dynamic ‘nature’ on which ‘culture’ would 
work over the course of human history to produce a distinctive region. Either 
way, space was treated as what Foucault called, in that same 1967 lecture, 
‘the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile.’ Against these views is 
a torrent of research in human geography that proposes a much livelier con-
ception of space. It focuses on space not only as the outcome of social and 
biophysical processes, a commonplace of human geography, but also as the 
medium through which they take place. This is a radical reformulation of 
the geographical prospectus, for if space is involved in both the outcome and the 
operation of social and biophysical processes, then we can make sense of what 
some commentators (inside and outside geography) have seen as a ‘spatial 
turn’ across the spectrum of the humanities and social sciences, and even 
beyond.70 The fact that we inhabit a world in which things and events are dis-
tributed in time and space is not an elementary observation of no great con-
sequence, something that sometimes makes drawing a map or describing the 
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context useful: it becomes central to our apprehension and explanation of 
the world.
We begin with three basic propositions about the ‘enlivening’ of space, 
which we’ll then use to examine the reformulation of the attendant concepts 
of place and landscape, region and territory.
First, time and space are now theorised and analysed conjointly. Most 
human geographers have abandoned the project of an autonomous science 
of the spatial, rejected conceptions of space as the fixed and frozen ground on 
which events take place or processes leave their marks, and now work with 
concepts of time-space.71 This project has taken many different forms, from a 
‘time-geography’ that not only narrates but visibly choreographs the ways in 
which time and space are woven into the conduct of everyday life, through 
placing a revived historical geography at what Cole Harris calls ‘the heart of 
a reconstructed human geography’, to the development of the far wider field 
of historico-geographical materialism.72 These and other developments all 
signal a decisive reversal of the ‘Great Retreat’ that so perturbed Sauer. Like 
him, historical geographers have long believed that ‘all geography is histor-
ical geography’ – the phrase can be traced back to Derwent Whittlesey and 
H.C. Darby73 – but this is a radically different historical-geographical scholar-
ship, less defensive about its disciplinary identity and with a far more developed 
sense of theoretical, methodological and political possibility.
Second, this has directed attention towards the co-production of time and 
space. Time-space is not an external grid that enframes and contains life on 
Earth, but is folded into the flows and forms of the world in which we find our-
selves. This is the basis for time-geography, in which time-space is conceived 
as a ‘resource’ on which individuals must draw in order to realise particular 
projects. In doing so they reproduce or transform the differential relations 
of power that enable or constrain their freedom of movement, and they do 
so by performing a ‘place ballet’, what Hägerstrand – the Swedish originator 
of time-geography – called a ‘weaving dance intime and space’ that is also a 
dance of time-space. In its original form this was all rather skeletal – Anne 
Buttimer described the formal time-geography diagrams as a danse macabre – 
but in the creative hands of Allan Pred it becomes clear that the folding of 
time-space into social life can be conveyed through a narrative that owes as 
much to the arts and humanities as it does to the social sciences.74 Similar 
ideas reappear in historico-geographical materialism.
One of Harvey’s cardinal achievements was to demonstrate that capital-
ism’s production of space is not incidental to its production of commodities, 
so that any viable political economy must incorporate the turbulent spatial-
ities of production and circulation as a central dimension of its critique.75 
But, as Noel Castree emphasises, Harvey’s project is simultaneously an histor-
ical and a geographical materialism, and the hyphen joining them is called 
upon to do a considerable amount of work. Harvey insists that capitalism 
‘is not a system whose operation occurs in space and through time, as if these 
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were empty matrices waiting to be filled with the diverse products of human 
activity’; instead space and time are ‘co-constituted’ and, as Castree puts it, 
capitalism ‘is spatio-temporal “all the way down”.’76 None of these authors 
can be assimilated to a single project – remember the heterodoxy of human 
geography – but Hägerstand and Pred, Harvey and Castree bring in to view 
the stubborn materialism of these ways of thinking about time-space. This is 
not the airy stuff of philosophical speculation (though it can be); these are 
all attempts to capture the sheer physicality of human geographies.77 In a 
similar vein, Nigel Thrift proposed the idea of ‘spatial formations’ to convey 
a sensuous ontology of practices and encounters between diverse, distrib-
uted bodies and things. This is closer to Hägerstrand than Harvey, because 
it operates through an analytics of the surface rather than the depth-models 
of mainstream Marxism, yet here too time-space is not apart from the world 
(which would be another version of the God-trick) but emerges as a process 
of continual co-construction ‘through the agency of things encountering each 
other in more or less organized circulations’.78
Third, human geographers are now much more willing to accept the 
unruliness of time-space. Most of them would probably agree that spatial sci-
ence and conventional social theory made too much of pattern and systematic-
ity, labouring in different registers to solve what they called ‘the problem of 
order’, without recognising the multiple ways in which life on Earth evades 
and exceeds those orders. They were both attempts to order what is now 
most often seen as a partially ordered world – to tidy it up. As the philosopher 
A.N. Whitehead warned, ‘Nature doesn’t come as clean as you can think it’, and 
it is in this spirit that much of human geography is increasingly exercised by the 
ways in which the coexistence of different time-spaces perturbs, disrupts and 
transforms the fields through which social and bio-physical processes operate. 
To be sure, time-space is not infinitely plastic: ‘certain forms of [time-]space 
tend to recur,’ Rose reminds us, ‘their repetition a sign of the power that satu-
rates the spatial.’79 And yet, while modalities of power often work to condense 
particular spatio-temporalities as ‘natural’ outcomes through architectures 
of surveillance and regulation, Doreen Massey insists that time-space is not 
a coherent system of discriminations and interconnections, a grid of ‘proper 
places’. She argues that it necessarily entails plurality and multiplicity. Hence 
spatial formations for her involve (and invite) ‘happenstance juxtapositions’ 
and ‘accidental separations’, so that time-space becomes a turbulent field of 
constellations and configurations: a world of structures and solidarities, disrup-
tions and dislocations that provides for the emergence of genuine novelty.80 
‘Emergence’ is not necessarily progressive or emancipatory, of course, and 
the argument may also be put in reverse: contemporary spaces of exception 
trade on paradoxical orderings of space whose very ambiguity is used to 
foreclose possibilities for political action. Either way, however, far from space 
being ‘the dead’, it is now theorised as being fully involved in the modulations 
of tension and transformation.
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You might think that all of this returns us to Hartshorne’s region, and 
the ‘physical classifications’ that enclose the co-existence of things in time or 
space. But if you re-read our last three paragraphs you will see that this is a 
return with a difference. Geography is no longer ruthlessly partitioned from 
History; time and space are no longer absolutes but defined in relation to 
people, events and objects, and these are not located ‘in’ time and space but 
enter into the co-production of time-space; and ‘physicality’ now carries a 
much livelier, more sensuous charge.
Reclaiming Conceptual Spaces
These developments can be traced in the genealogies of other spatial concepts, 
but these have their own particularities too. During the heyday of spatial sci-
ence place and landscape were relegated to the margins of human geography 
while concepts like region and territory were reduced to abstract geometries. 
‘Place’ was marginalised because it was seen as subjective, a jumble of attach-
ments that was not immediately susceptible to scientific analysis; all a human 
geographer could do was describe a place in all its particularity. Some certainly 
saw this as a higher calling, and early humanistic geography became deeply 
invested in the meaning of place and its more or less literary evocation. But 
this often congealed into a conservative, romanticised sense of place. ‘To be 
human,’ Edward Relph declared, ‘is to live in a world that is filled with sig-
nificant places: to be human is to know your place.’ This sense of attachment, 
of belonging and feeling at home, was supposed to be affirmative, and many 
writers including Relph endorsed what Yi-Fu Tuan called ‘topophilia’ (love of 
place) and gave grateful thanks for its distance from ‘placelessness’ and the 
homogenised ‘non-places’ of the modern world (malls, airports, hotels).81 On 
this reading, ‘place’ denoted an older, slower, more authentic world: a still point 
in the now spinning spaces of modernity. More recent writings have troubled 
these constructions. Places are inhabited by multiple, conflicting meanings. 
People may refuse to ‘know their place’; they may transgress the codes that 
regulate a place, or they may take back places that have been taken from them 
or to which they have been denied access.82 For everyone who feels at home, 
comfortable and safe in a place, there are others who feel lost, frightened 
and vulnerable. Places can excite pleasure, security and affection, but also 
pain, fear and revulsion, and all of them can invest places with profound and 
contradictory meanings. In these ways, place is bound in to both the play of 
power and the construction of identities – so that there is a doubled politics 
of place and identity83 – and the erasure of a place can have traumatic conse-
quences for those whose lives are affected.84 Places, like identities, are always 
in the process of becoming, and at the limit many human geographers now 
treat place as process.85 In doing so, they have come to see places as almost 
always impure, not tightly bounded but open and porous. Places, writes 
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Doreen Massey, are meeting places in which various trajectories collide, ‘woven 
together out of ongoing stories, as a moment within power-geometries, as a 
particular constellation within wider topographies of space.’86 Far from being 
fixed and still, places are knottings, tied and untied, entangled and disentan-
gled. Seen like this, place is not a refuge from the modern but, like space, is 
made much livelier: in Peter Merriman’s words, ‘much more contingent, open, 
dynamic and heterogeneous’ than the standard usages allowed.87
‘Landscape’ too seemed out of joint with spatial science. Unless it could be 
idealised as an isotropic plane, it was seen as belonging to an older, plodding 
geography that was limited to reconstructing its morphologies. But there were 
close links between the mathematical and geometric logics of spatial science 
and what Denis Cosgrove and others, drawing on art history, called landscape as 
a ‘way of seeing’. For the staging of the world as a landscape depended on the 
mathematics of linear perspective, and Cosgrove and his colleagues showed 
that this visual ideology emerged in Europe in the fifteenth and early sixteenth 
centuries and, in line with the developing materialism of human geography, 
that it was saturated in the tonalities of early capitalism. Its trick of represent-
ing three-dimensional space on a two-dimensional surface was achieved by 
rendering space ‘the property of an individual, detached observer, from whose 
divine location it is a dependent, appropriated object.’ For Cosgrove, this vision 
asserted a class privilege; it was a bourgeois gaze whose production simultane-
ously declared possession, delimited property, and depended on patronage.88 
Rose soon added a powerful rider: this was also a profoundly gendered way 
of seeing, and functioned to naturalise the masculinism of the gaze.89 These 
interventions stirred up the complacent view that limited geography’s ‘art of 
landscape’ to the field sketch, but other human geographers worried about the 
danger of losing the physicality of the landscape in the chase after its repre-
sentations. Don Mitchell argued for a re-cognition of its material presence: 
landscapes, he claimed, in a remark that would not have been out of place in an 
older school of historical geography, are the products of work, ‘of human 
labour.’ But he left that tradition in the dust when he also claimed that land-
scape does work. Cosgrove’s deep interest in visual ideology was relocated to 
a brilliantly physical register. ‘In many respects,’ he explained, landscapes pro-
duced under capitalism – what Harvey calls landscapes of accumulation – are 
like the commodity: they conceal (‘fetishise’) the labour that goes into their 
making. When he writes about ‘the lie of the land’, therefore, Mitchell is simul-
taneously reactivating a traditional concern with the forms and features of 
the visible landscape and drawing attention to its duplicity. His purpose is to 
unsettle, disrupt and call into question the outer unity of landscape – its aes-
thetic harmony and ‘natural’ integrity – and disclose the struggles and con-
flicts that seethe below its surface.90 But when John Wylie turned to ‘practices 
of landscape and, especially, towards the simultaneous and ongoing shap-
ing of self, body and landscape via practice[s] and performance[s]’, he did not 
have in mind the experiences of the migrant workers whose lives (and deaths) 
Editors’ Introduction li
are concealed in the agrarian landscapes of southern California. His project 
was based on the walker’s or traveller’s corporeal encounter with a landscape. 
In one way, his project unsettles the visual ideology that was the object of 
Cosgrove’s critique, because it ‘turns landscape from a distant object or spec-
tacle to be visually surveyed to an up-close, intimate and proximate material 
milieu of engagement and practice.’ And yet, when landscape thus becomes ‘the 
close-at-hand, that which is both touching and touched, an affective handling 
through which self and world emerge and entwine’, it is surely not difficult 
to translate this into Mitchell’s migrants feeling the earth of the California 
valleys trickle through their bruised fingers or the stonemasons running their 
hands over the blocks of Brunelleschi’s dome that is the focal point of Cosgrove’s 
account.91 Either way, landscape, like place, becomes alive.
Regions and territories were retained by spatial science but in purely for-
mal terms, as nodal regions or marketing territories that marked ‘spheres of 
influence’ whose ‘influence’ was strangely purged of any tincture of political or 
economic power. This too has been dramatically reversed. A revitalised history 
of geography has shown that regional geography had a strategic dimension 
from its very beginning. When Strabo developed the classical Greek conception 
of chorography, of regional description, he wrote as an admirer of the Roman 
emperor Augustus and his successor, Tiberius, and his Geography was intended 
to be of direct service to imperial administrators and military commanders.92 
Fast forward to the twentieth century, and a traditional regional geography was 
pressed into military service during the two World Wars and the Cold War.93 
In both cases these enlistments also required a technical capacity to fix and 
locate: in a word, to map. One might say much the same about the concept 
of territory, which relies on a strategic discourse and a political technology 
too, except that its conceptual armature is also wrapped in legal formularies.94 
Critical human geography today is more likely to resist these deadly complici-
ties, and its conceptualisations of region and territory share in the general 
‘enlivening’ that we have identified for space, place and landscape.
Regions are now rarely seen as so many building blocks, a device that is 
at once partitional (it assumes that the world can be exhaustively divided 
into bounded spaces) and aggregative (these spaces can be fitted together to 
form a larger totality). Our present understanding of regions suggest that they 
have never been closed, cellular spaces, and that much of traditional regional 
geography – rather like traditional descriptions of ‘place’ – may turn out to have 
been about inventing a ‘traditional’ world of supposedly immobile, introspective 
and irredeemably localised cultures. Many anthropologists, geographers and 
historians now accept that non-capitalist societies have always been actively 
engaged in other worlds, and that they always been constituted through their 
involvements in more extensive networks. Those involvements have been 
intensified by capitalist modernity, even transformed by them, but they are not 
the creation of the modern. There is a broad consensus that regional forma-
tions are more or less impermanent condensations of institutions and objects, 
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people and practices that are intimately involved in the operations and out-
come of local, trans-local and trans-regional processes. Once regions are 
conceptually ‘unbound’, as Ash Amin puts it, then bounding and b/ordering 
become the precarious historico-geographical achievements of political and 
military, economic and cultural power.95 Similarly, territory comes to be seen 
as what Stuart Elden calls ‘a historical question: produced, mutable and fluid’ 
but also simultaneously as a geographical question ‘not simply because it is 
one way of ordering the world, but also because it is profoundly uneven in its 
development.’96 For much the same reason, many human geographers have 
become much more attentive to the ways in which these scalar distinctions 
have been produced and to their sedimentations in imaginative geographies 
and public policies.97
All of this has produced new ways of writing about regions and border-
lands. Soja’s early experiment in ‘taking Los Angeles apart’ has been followed 
by a host of others, many of them multi-media presentations that draw on 
film, video and music too. Others make use of the interactivity of new media, 
including blogs, to present multi-perspectival views of places to wider publics. 
These are by their very nature usually non-disciplinary or interdisciplinary 
projects, but the ‘problem’ of geographical description has never seemed less 
of a problem and more of an opportunity.98
These experiments with fluidity, mobility and hybridity can seem intox-
icating, which makes it all the more important not to lose sight of their other 
dimensions. By this we mean not only the fixities and immobilities that limit 
the lives of millions of people – a counter-geography to the ‘liquid world’ cele-
brated by those with the freedom to take advantage of it: again, we draw atten-
tion to the figure of the migrant and the refugee99 – but also the violence and 
immiseration that often inheres in these paradoxical spaces. Gloria Anzaldúa 
famously described the US-Mexico borderlands as ‘an open wound’ where 
‘the Third World grates against the First and bleeds.’ Before a scab can form, 
she continued, ‘it hemorrhages again, the lifeblood of two worlds merging 
to form a third country – a border culture.’ Matthew Coleman thus sees the 
US-Mexico border as a trickster figure, at once being opened to the passage 
of capital and (licit) commodities under the sign of neoliberalism and closed 
to the movement of ‘undocumented’ migrants who are often the victims of 
neoliberalism. For him, the border is performed through the countervail-
ing operations of ‘de-bordering’ and ‘re-bordering’, in the course of which 
Anzaldúa’s sanguinary metaphor has become ever more appropriate as the 
border is increasingly militarised as part of the ‘war on drugs’ that since 9/11 
has morphed into the ‘war on terror’.100 On those borders where military 
violence is an ever-present reality, where the fixity of the line has yielded to 
the fluidity of attack and counter-attack, the result is often a ‘space of excep-
tion’ in which legal protections are removed from people who are knowingly 
exposed to death. As Derek Gregory has shown, across the Green Line from 
Israel into the occupied Palestinian territories on the West Bank of the Jordan, 
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these zones of indistinction have proliferated and Palestinians are trapped 
in ‘a frenzied cartography of mobile frontiers’ in which time and space are 
twisted and deformed so that ‘nothing is fixed, nothing is clear’. Or again, 
across the Durand Line from Afghanistan into Pakistan’s Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas, a liminal space that has been turned into a war zone, ordinary 
people are exposed to death from orbiting drones as the United States seeks 
to find and kill Taliban insurgents and members of al-Qaeda.101 These may 
all be ‘lively’ spaces but they are also, and by virtue of their liveliness, spaces 
of death.
Nature, Environment and the Non-human
The Great Divide
What David Livingstone once called ‘the geographical experiment’ was 
founded on a Big Idea: that it was possible to examine the relations between 
people and their environments, or ‘culture’ and ‘nature’, within the confines 
of one great scientific enterprise. There has long been disagreement over 
the nature of that enterprise – as Livingstone shows, it’s an essentially con-
tested tradition102 – but for much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
it was conducted within what David Stoddart called the ‘great tradition’ of 
the natural sciences. As we’ve explained, this is a story that can be told in 
many different ways. Stoddart invoked a radically different lineage from 
what he dismissed as ‘conventional wisdom’, whose heroes were ‘the Ritters, 
Ratzels, Hettners’. These were three largely desk-bound German geographers 
who were admitted to Hartshorne’s canon, not least through their ‘spatial’ 
predilections, but Stoddart’s oppositional sense of geography as an intellec-
tual enterprise sprang from the exploratory field sciences of Georg Forster, 
Charles Darwin and T.H. Huxley: ‘and it works,’ he added triumphantly.103 One 
would surely have to add Humboldt to this trinity, whose vision of the Cosmos 
was an exquisite version of the exploratory tradition that Stoddart eulogised 
and the synoptic project of geography that he too endorsed. But even those 
who follow different routes, perhaps closer to Hartshorne’s, that by the end 
of the nineteenth century tracked through the humanities and the emergent 
social sciences, would concede that these were profoundly affected by the 
natural sciences. These other routes turned out to vitally important because 
they led from a pre-disciplinary world – in which the scholar roamed the world 
and roamed the library in equal measure – to a more cloistered, disciplinary 
world. By then, modern geography had gained a significant but small foothold 
in English-speaking and European universities, and its practitioners more or 
less agreed that that geography crossed an emerging divide between what 
today we would call the earth and environmental sciences (including geology, 
geomorphology, botany and climatology) on one side and the humanities and 
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social sciences (including history, anthropology, economics and sociology) 
on the other. As the young Halford Mackinder put it in his 1887 address to 
the Royal Geographical Society in London, geography would bridge ‘one of the 
greatest of all intellectual gaps’: it would, he advertised, ‘trace the interaction 
of man in society and so much of his environment as varies locally’.104
The challenge was enormous. Given the vast range of topics that Geog-
raphy claimed to cover, what ideas and approaches could it claim as its own, 
and what signature insights could it provide? Could it equal the intellectual 
status of the specialist sciences like physics or economics by somehow mak-
ing a virtue of its totalising or synthesising perspective on the world? These 
questions did not apply only to Geography, since it was closely allied to an 
Anthropology that also placed the relations between people and their environ-
ment at the centre of its concerns. Even so, the early university geographers 
were in select company: few of their academic peers chose to make the human 
and biophysical worlds – from the scale of everyday life up to the globe – the 
combined focus of their inquiries.
Consistent with these grand ambitions, Mackinder and his colleagues 
refused any clear distinction between ‘human’ and ‘physical’ geographies. 
Although Mary Somerville had devoted a book to physical geography in 1849 – 
defining it as ‘a description of the earth, the sea, and the air, with their inhabit-
ants animal and vegetable, of the distribution of these organised beings, and 
the causes of their distribution’105 – few university geographers followed her 
lead, and most tended to examine human populations in relation to their 
immediate biophysical surroundings. These studies took several forms. First, 
there were detailed investigations of different places and regions, the sort of 
work that Hartshorne would later represent as the core of geographical inquiry. 
They typically sought to demonstrate the distinctive connections between 
economy, politics, society and culture and the physical landscape, climate and 
relative location of an area.106 Second, there were much grander attempts to 
describe the world’s geography as a patchwork of biophysical regions that were 
associated with characteristic patterns of human habitation. These authors – 
like Ellen Semple in her Influences of geographic environment (1911) – took 
their readers on a grand tour of the earth’s differentiated surface but, like 
most tourists, paid selective attention to the places they visited.107 Third, some 
geographers, working on an equally large canvas, focused on one element of 
human practice (such as state-craft) and related it to environmental causes 
and circumstances. Mackinder’s own Britain and the British Seas (1902) is 
one example among many: it was an attempt to understand the geopolitical 
manoeuvrings of Britain as a maritime nation.108
All of these studies were highly descriptive; the early university geog-
raphers found it virtually impossible to treat causation and process in any detail 
because they tried to cover so much ground, often on a planetary scale. Where 
explanations were ventured they were typically speculative, even breezy, and 
possessed none of the rigour of the spatial science that would eclipse them 
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after 1945. Yet these speculations were offered with supreme confidence, as 
if they possessed substantial empirical warrant. This can in part be explained 
by a combination of Darwinian thinking and neo-Lamarkianism that was a 
major influence on intellectual culture at the turn of the twentieth century 
(in fact, this is what Livingstone had in mind when he invoked the geographical 
experiment). Like many other American and European intellectuals, university 
geographers saw no problem in extending Darwin’s paradigmatic inquiries 
into species evolution to humans.109 The ‘races of man’, as they were called, 
were seen as the products of adaptation to more or less favourable natural 
environments, with Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s thesis about ‘fast evolution’ 
pressed into service (implicitly or otherwise) to argue that Anglo-Europeans 
had been able to progress more rapidly than other ‘races’ with less advantag-
eous physical geographic conditions. The result was a curiously asymmetrical 
application of what became known as environmental determinism. Europeans 
were held to have domesticated their temperate, ‘normal’, so to speak ‘natural’ 
natures, obliging them to give up their secrets to Science and their energies 
to Industry, while other cultures were held to be creatures of their non-
temperate, abnormal and even ‘un-natural natures’.110 To describe the asym-
metry in these terms is to reveal its abiding racism: thus, for example, Ellsworth 
Huntington’s reflections on The character of races (1924) claimed that vari-
ous ‘natives’ in the world’s tropical and ‘frigid’ zones could never rise above 
the challenging environments that made them what they were. Regrettably 
these were not exceptional views; anxieties about the dangers of tropical nature 
for ‘temperate’ cultures bedevilled the colonial and imperial project, and at 
that time eugenics – the ‘science of racial improvement’ – enjoyed widespread 
respectability before Hitler’s Third Reich took it to its still more hideous and 
ultimately genocidal conclusion.
By the time Hartshorne visited Nazi-occupied Vienna, the prospects for 
the unified Geography that had captivated scholars in a pre-disciplinary world 
were dimming, even though Hartshorne and his critics continued to affirm 
their faith in human and physical geography as conjoint moments in discip-
linary inquiry. Dramatic advances were being made elsewhere in the academy 
in the natural sciences and the social sciences – from Einstein’s epoch-making 
discoveries in physics to J.M. Keynes’ seminal contributions to economics – and 
these had thrown geography’s shortcomings into stark relief and threatened 
to consign it to a backwater far from the mainstream of scientific progress. 
The predicament was heightened during the Second World War, when many 
geographers on both sides of the Atlantic served in the military and intelli-
gence services and learned an object lesson in the importance of precision and 
measurement, systematicity and objectivity.111 But there were other pressures 
from other directions. Many philosophers had argued that the physical sci-
ences were intrinsically different from the humanities and the social sciences 
by virtue of their subject matter. The geographical experiment was doomed 
to failure: there could be no unified science of people-and-nature because 
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people were distinctly different from rocks, rivers or ravines. Unlike atoms 
or molecules, people inhabit a world of socially constructed meanings that 
are indispensable for its interpretation and transformation; they are able to 
create their own history and geography in reflexive, conscious and even uncon-
scious ways that are unavailable to stones rolling along riverbeds. Though 
cusped between biology and culture, people are not reducible to their genes 
or their physiologies, let alone to forces exerted by the physical environment. 
This was not only a rebuff to environmental determinism and its derivatives 
but also a counter-claim that the ‘non-biological’ aspects of humanity could be 
analysed in their own right (which is, of course, what sociologists, economists, 
musicologists, art historians and cultural anthropologists had been arguing 
for years).
After 1945 academic Geography splintered into human geography and 
physical geography, with each fragmenting into a series of systematic sub-
disciplines. The terms ‘human geography’ and ‘physical geography’ began to 
name two distinct projects within a single disciplinary space. Other discip-
lines were bi-polar too – physical and social anthropology for example – and, 
like them, geography gave these distinctions a substantive rather than purely 
nominal significance. Perhaps more importantly, these were all so many ver-
sions of an even greater divide in a minor key. In 1956 C.P. Snow sketched the 
outlines of a thesis about ‘two cultures’ that, just a few years later, he would 
deliver as a lecture that would cause a sensation.112 Snow had trained as a 
physicist in the 1920s, and during the war served as Chief of Scientific Person-
nel for the Ministry of Labour in Great Britain; after the war he embarked on a 
parallel, highly successful career as a novelist. ‘By training I was a scientist,’ he 
later wrote, ‘but ‘by vocation a writer.’ In his 1959 Rede Lecture at Cambridge, 
‘The two cultures and the scientific revolution’, Snow declared that he had 
felt as though he were ‘moving among two groups’ who ‘had almost ceased 
to communicate at all’, and he was quick to add that this was not a personal 
odyssey but a pervasive feature of intellectual life in the West. ‘At one pole 
we have the literary intellectuals,’ he explained, and at the other ‘scientists, 
and as the most representative the physical scientists.’ A ‘gulf of incomprehen-
sion’ lay between them – ‘sometime hostility and dislike, but most of all lack 
of understanding. They have a curious distorted image of each other.’ Snow 
thought this a tragedy, an exceptionally destructive loss to both sides that was 
particularly damaging at the height of the Cold War. Insisting that ‘scientific 
culture really is a culture,’ Snow complained that ‘there seems to be no place 
where the cultures meet.’113
And yet, of course, Geography had long claimed to be that place. It would 
be absurd to read the rise of spatial science as a response to Snow, though 
his arguments were (and remain) influential, but it did seek to capitalise on 
the second part of Snow’s title – ‘the scientific revolution’ – and to show that 
his ‘scientific culture’ was capable of addressing both the human and the 
physical worlds. Its inspiration was not Snow, however, but Thomas Kuhn, 
whose account of The structure of scientific revolutions just three years later 
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provided a powerful rhetorical model for the ‘Quantitative Revolution’. This 
was ironic; Kuhn’s account fastened on the physical sciences – in fact, he won-
dered if it was not limited to the physical sciences – but he drew on a series 
of methods from the humanities to develop his concept of a ‘paradigm’ for 
scientific inquiry.114 During the Quantitative Revolution, however, geography 
turned its face – or, more accurately, the face of most of its practitioners – 
from the stuff of the ‘literary humanities’ to the geometries of the earth’s 
surface. In fact many of the models of spatial science were derived from the 
physical sciences: the gravity model calibrating the ‘friction of distance’ on 
the interaction between two locations is the most obvious, but the neoclas-
sical economics on which most standard location theory depended was 
closely related to statistical mechanics.
If this achieved a precarious unity between human and physical geography, 
however, it was remarkably short-lived. During the 1960s, two British geog-
raphers, one a human geographer (Peter Haggett) and the other a physical 
geographer (R.J. Chorley), tried to jumpstart the stalled geographical experi-
ment. In a series of publications they proposed to unite human and physical 
geography through a common object (spatial order), a common method (the 
‘scientific method’), and a common conceptual apparatus (systems analysis).115 
But the project was abandoned.
On one side, physical geographers retained (and, in fact, reinforced) their 
commitment to science, though now usually phrased in different terms that 
turned from positivism to non-positivist philosophies of science and directed 
attention from form to process. This is not the place to review the increasingly 
separate history of the subdiscipline, but in general physical geographers dir-
ected their research and teaching to fact-based descriptions, explanations 
and predictions of earth surface phenomena. Specialisation, new databases and 
remote sensing capabilities, new field techniques and computer technologies, 
and new physical and mathematical models made this possible, but the price 
was, at first, further internal division. Physical geographers partitioned their field 
into five major areas – geomorphology, biogeography, climatology, hydrology, 
and Quaternary environmental change – and fostered increasingly close con-
nections and collaborations with scientists in cognate fields like geology, botany 
and atmospheric science. It is only recently, and in part through these extra-
disciplinary conversations, that reintegration has been set in motion through 
avowedly interdisciplinary projects like Earth Systems Science and the rise 
of the ‘biogeosciences’ (particularly in North America).116
On the other side, the critique of spatial science drew many human geog-
raphers deeper into the modern social sciences while at the same time prompt-
ing a series of calls for the traditional ties with the arts and the humanities to be 
reaffirmed (though not always in traditional ways). Here too the consequence 
was a series of divisions. One axis was sub-disciplinary – the formation and 
consolidation of separate economic, political, social and cultural geographies, 
for example, with often only historical geography and historico-geographical 
materialism to muddle things up – and the other was procedural: a divergence 
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between a spatial-analytic geography, markedly less interested in geometric 
order than its predecessors, and a social-theoretic geography, much more inter-
ested in political critique. In the face of such diversity, it was sometimes hard 
to see the forest for the trees – and the different woodcutters hacking away 
at them (though, in parallel with physical geography, close connections were 
developed with economists, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, 
historians and literary scholars). In fact, however, most of us saw neither the 
forest nor the trees. Human geography typically abstracted economic, political, 
social and cultural practices from their biophysical circumstances, an abstrac-
tion indexed most visibly by the rise of an urban geography that analysed the 
created, ‘artificial’ environment of the post-war metropolis.
Human geography was ‘de-naturalised’, a process that was equally apparent 
in the humanities and social sciences from which it drew its inspiration, while 
physical geography – apart from consultancy projects to do with problems of 
coastal management, soil erosion slope failure and the like – was effectively 
‘de-socialised’. Where the human-environment nexus remained a subject of 
concern – as in Gilbert White’s research into how people perceive and respond 
to the threat of natural hazards – it was conducted in a way that reflected 
the commitment to a model of science that much of human geography had 
abandoned. Even when the environmental movement took its first steps, few 
geographers trailed along. The era of the first Earth Day, when Greenpeace 
and Friends of the Earth were founded, did not inspire a revival of human-
environment study in Geography. Instead, people like White and his students 
went about their business without generating any sea-change in the topical 
focus of their colleagues in human and physical geography.
These differences were reflected and reproduced in the divergent publica-
tion practices of human and physical geographers: they increasingly turned 
the pages of different journals (or different pages in the same journal), and 
for every supposedly general journal there seemed to be at least ten special-
ist journals in the different sub-disciplines of physical and human geography. 
In the United States many programmes in geography were predominantly 
and sometimes exclusively programmes in human geography, while in most 
Scandinavian countries human and physical geographers occupied separate 
departments within the same university (and still do). Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
by the mid-1980s, many geographers started to wonder if there was any longer 
any reason to think that human and physical geography could be sustained 
as two halves of a unitary disciplinary field.117
The Re-naturalisation of Human Geography
Over the last twenty-five years there has been a gathering reaction to the 
‘denaturalisation’ of human geography that has gained momentum until now 
nature, in all its attendant varieties, is one of the central terms of contemporary 
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human geography. The reasons for this are as much external and internal, and 
here as elsewhere there is no simple separation between text and context, 
inside and outside. Environmental incidents – oil spills, species extinctions, 
landslides, earthquakes, tsunamis and much more besides – have rarely been 
out of the news this last quarter century. Less dramatically, but no less seri-
ously, the evidence for human-induced climate change is now unequivocal. 
The growth in global population and levels of consumer demand – within the 
context of capitalist globalisation – have ramped up levels of natural resource 
use, producing relative scarcity, price fluctuations and vast volumes of waste. 
The technical prowess of applied science is now such that it can splice genes 
and clone organisms, challenging ethical norms about how we should regard 
our own biological ‘nature’ and that of non-human species. Environmental 
protest movements and pressure groups remain as visible now as they were 
during the era of the first Earth Day, four decades ago. Research councils and 
organisations funding the full range of university disciplines have promoted 
research into the relations into the society-environment nexus, as well as the 
wider impacts of the life and biomedical sciences.
The cultural critic Raymond Williams once described Nature as one of 
the most complicated words in the English language, so it is not surprising 
that, in responding to all the predicaments and possibilities sketched in the 
last paragraph, ‘nature’ should have been given various interpretations and 
required the supplements we have signposted: ‘environment’ and the ‘non-
human’. The latter is not simply a synonym for the other two; it describes 
all those densely material phenomena – from buildings to domestic gardens 
to commodities – that are neither strictly ‘natural’ nor part of ‘the environ-
ment’ in its conventional sense. These bear the marks of human intentional-
ity in their creation, use and meaning but, as with all materials, they have a 
specific texture, shape, composition and efficacy of their own. Indeed, this 
is so important that some commentators have described this as a process 
of ‘re-materialisation’ too, by which they mean a new focus on the substance of 
the world, including our own bodies.
The re-naturalisation/materialisation of human geography through work 
conducted under these three banners has deepened and widened our under-
standing of the field. But it has not completely dug it over: the roots of these 
changes lie, in part, in research traditions that were, if not exactly fallow, then 
cultivated at the margins. But they also involve the creation of new hybrids 
by grafting a concern with the biophysical world onto (and into) theories and 
perspectives that previously paid remarkably little attention to that world.
There are two modern baselines for today’s re-naturalised approaches: 
research into hazards and studies of land use change. The contributions 
of Gilbert White and his students to our knowledge of ‘natural hazards’ in 
the decades following the Second World War were of considerable practical 
importance; they interrogated the ways in which communities calculated and 
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responded to risks from floods, droughts, earthquakes and other hazards, and 
this was of obvious and direct interest to international organisations, state 
agencies and insurance companies. Yet by the end of the twentieth century 
more and people were being harmed by ‘natural disasters’ despite decades of 
research into risk minimisation and mitigation. In an important critical inter-
vention Kenneth Hewitt and his collaborators argued that the root of the prob-
lem was the term itself. ‘Natural’ and ‘disaster’ had to be prised apart because 
so-called ‘natural’ events like flooding may be caused in part by human action 
(or inaction), but the epicentre of the ‘disaster’ was almost always political 
and social. Restricting policy prescriptions to technocratic solutions like flood 
defences or zoning restrictions on building, so they claimed, deflected atten-
tion from the differential vulnerability of populations to hazard events.118 This 
critique was of double significance. It reaffirmed the importance of what, for 
those who knew their Marx, was his materialist dialectic between ‘nature’ and 
‘society’, which was already providing the mainspring for projects from polit-
ical economy through to political ecology. These in their turn would provoke a 
new round of critical responses from cultural constructions of what counts as 
‘nature’ to a revitalised analysis of human populations – and life itself – under 
the sign of what Foucault called biopolitics. This critique also reinforced the 
developing political and ethical sensibilities of human geography. It required 
the category of people ‘at risk’ to be deconstructed by locating the space of 
vulnerability (and the space of resilience) within a socio-economic matrix 
of inequality and information. It also demanded an involvement with politics 
as much as policy or, rather, an awareness that policy, in both its formulation 
and its implementation, is never a narrowly managerial exercise involving 
expert knowledges but is also always a profoundly political practice.119
And yet it is important not to ignore the continued development and even 
enlargement of the technical base for studying these questions. The formation 
of two avowedly interdisciplinary fields, ‘land change science’ and ‘sustain-
ability science’, has depended on the use of remote sensing imagery and GIS 
techniques to create, manipulate and analyse macro-scale, multi-dimensional 
data bases that capture, display and monitor land use and other environmental 
changes.120 Other human geographers have been drawn into other large-scale 
projects to gauge the human involvements (not merely impacts) of global 
climate change. The ultimate objective of these ‘Big Science’ projects is to 
record humanity’s ecological footprint on the planet and, like White’s work, 
they have been of considerable importance to policy makers, state bureauc-
racies and government officials. They have been a particularly important 
(re)source for international and state actors seeking to manage, conserve and 
preserve areas of the biophysical world deemed to be of special ecological, 
aesthetic or cultural value (the iconic example is the Amazon rainforest).
The provision of expert knowledges does not make these scholars politically 
reactionary – though when their parent sciences turn into Sciences (with that 
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imperial capital again) that discount lay or indigenous knowledges it is not 
surprising they should attract spirited criticism121 – and there have been fruit-
ful reciprocal exchanges between them and an overtly political ecology; but 
neither does it make these scientists ‘neutral’, providers of ‘facts’ free from polit-
ical judgements of the sort that state actors are charged with making.122
Other approaches have addressed the politics of environmental change 
(and, ultimately, of ‘nature’) much more directly. Two derive directly from 
human geography’s engagement with historical materialism. Many of its 
early conversations were strangely silent about the nature-society dialectic, 
which usually appeared only in preliminary and usually abstract accounts of 
the ‘material base’ of the mode of production where it served to prepare the 
ground for the analytics of the capitalist production of space. This state of 
affairs was disrupted with extraordinary brio when Neil Smith insisted that 
the production of space could not be understood apart from what he called 
‘the production of nature’.123 The recognition that capitalism produced – not 
merely dominated, exploited or appropriated – nature was central to the polit-
ical economy of environment and resources and to a self-consciously political 
ecology. The first of these typically focused on specific ‘regional capitalisms’ – 
on the co-production of particular spaces, exemplified by Richard Walker’s 
study of California’s ‘Golden Road to Riches’ (for some, at any rate) which lay 
through minerals, forests and water, or by Michael Watts’s compelling studies of 
petro-capitalism in the Niger Delta124 – but it also spiralled beyond the circles, 
cycles and crises of capital accumulation to capture the physical presence of 
the non-human world: for Watts, ‘the devil’s excrement’ that was oil, or for 
Scott Prudham the spotted owl that raised a hue and cry over the exploitation 
of old-growth forests in the Pacific Northwest.125
The animating concept for these studies was the commodification of 
nature. That this was a process pre-existing the present bears emphasis, and 
as such it overlaps with histories that reach back far beyond the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. These were meat and drink to a distinguished 
tradition of research into agrarian-ecological change in cultural geography, 
but this is now reinforced by research in environmental history that traces 
the paths through which resources have been turned into commodities. In a 
seminal study of the ecological transformation of New England between 1600 
and 1800, William Cronon described in exquisite detail how ‘changes in the 
land’ were brought about by labile interactions between indigenous peoples 
and European settlers that culminated, as Edward Johnson wrote in 1653, in 
‘the wilderness turned a mart’: the ‘wilderness’ turned into a market.126 The 
process, in part (but only in part) a conjunction of economic and ecological 
imperialism, intensified with industrialisation, including the industrialisa-
tion of agriculture itself, which later prompted Cronon to describe Chicago, 
the artificial heart of the Great Plains, as ‘Nature’s metropolis’.127 The cross-
fertilisations between these fields have been immensely fruitful, spawning 
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investigations into commodity chains like the contemporary ‘agro-food’ net-
works that connect investors, farms, seed firms, pesticide manufacturers and 
others with (usually) far distant food consumers.128 By revealing the socio-
spatial relations that materially enact the passage from resource to commodity 
these studies have shown how the biophysical world has become a means not 
an end in a process that produces not only nature but also social and envir-
onmental injustice. These consequences, it is now clear, cannot be attributed 
simply to ‘corrupt’ politicians or to ‘greedy’ elites – even when corruption and 
greed are plain to see – but are systemic, rooted in the basal logics of political 
economy, even in the most war-torn, autocratic and unstable countries.129
The second set of studies, in political ecology, can also be traced back to 
older traditions of research, especially in cultural geography and cultural ecol-
ogy, but its modern foundation stones were laid by investigations into peasant 
cultures and rural economies in the global South. These investigations, led 
by Piers Blaikie and Harold Brookfield, traced the ways in which rural com-
munities in South Asia and elsewhere were influenced by distant forces like 
international trade, inward investment and political decision-making at the 
national level. This implied that local land use decisions had to be explained 
through a causal cascade that extended up to the global level, and which often 
involved unequal relations of power that allowed land users limited room for 
manoeuvre.130 This did not displace analysis, still less concern away from local 
land users, however, and these wider perspectives required a complemen-
tary, closely textured analysis of the local economy, culture and society that 
was sensitive to the varied roles of land users and unpacked generic categor-
ies like ‘peasant’, ‘small holder’ or ‘herder’.131 As a result of this multi-scalar 
approach, political ecologists downgraded the causal role of local ecology 
(‘environment’) in explaining land use patterns in the global South – which 
was a standard ruse of environmental determinism – and they challenged the 
no less imperial, no less shop-worn doctrine of neo-Malthusianism, which 
invoked regional ‘over-population’ to explain (for example) famine.132 In the 
wake of these seminal studies, subsequent research has – like many of their 
original subjects – moved into the cities of the global South; it has also arced 
back to the global North, not as a distant actor but as the site of other, equally 
local and trans-local political ecologies.133
There are no hard and fast lines between the approaches of political econ-
omy and political ecology, so that the differences are mainly ones of focus or 
emphasis. The two streams have braided into one another, and many geog-
raphers swim in both. But they also find another common, and to their critics, 
more uncertain ground. Smith’s emphasis on the production of nature placed 
its explanatory weight on the productive (and destructive) capacities of the 
social; so too the political economy of environment and resources. Even polit-
ical ecology in most of its versions privileged political and economic processes 
over biophysical processes, which prompted some commentators to wonder 
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‘where the ecology had gone’ and to direct human geographers to develop-
ments in biogeography and ecological science.134
The same might be said of a further round of research that builds on and 
responds to these approaches. That resonant phrase, ‘the wilderness turned 
a mart’, conceals a double movement. For it points not only forwards – to the 
transformation of resources into commodities – but also backwards. It was a 
commonplace of an older ‘resource geography’ that, as Erich Zimmerman 
argued, ‘resources are not; they become’.135 But if resources (and markets) 
are cultural constructions – matters and materialities of human appraisal, 
imagination and invention – then so too, as Cronon urged, is ‘wilderness’.136 
It’s then a small step to radicalise this insight and to see that every element 
of ‘nature’ – far from standing outside ‘culture’ – is always already culturally 
‘constructed’. Mountains, forests and bears are simply unintelligible without 
a great deal of work that is typically unrecognised by expert and lay actors 
alike: hence Braun’s emphasis on the ‘buried epistemologies’ that construct 
and normalise particular ‘natures’. As he subsequently showed, these are more 
than epistemologies – theories of what counts as knowledge – and their exhu-
mation requires an analysis of the productive work that is done by discourse 
more generally.137 Discourse is to be understood not only as a torrent of words 
and images but also as a series of techniques and practices that, in certain 
circumstances, produce the objects that they name: in other words, they are 
performative. Just as the discourse of tropicality produces ‘the tropics’, so a 
series of discourses, both inside and outside science, work together to produce 
the still wider, taken-for-granted, ostensibly ‘natural’ concept of ‘nature’. For, 
as Nancy Stepan remarks, ‘Nature is not “natural” but is created as natural’, so 
that what counts as ‘nature’ is not given in nature.138 These discourses have 
their own topographies and circulations. Sometimes they are confined to – 
and in fact help to reproduce – specific discursive communities, so that the 
promissory note that treats science as a social practice is redeemed in full 
measure in (for example) studies of the ways in which atmospheric scientists 
have come to define and understand ‘normal’ climatic behaviour.139 But, as the 
heated debate over global climate change shows, these discourses often spill 
over into other, more public circles – and, similarly, work to produce publics – 
and enter into the collective, consciously articulated identity of particular 
sections of society.140
Bio-political geographies have also inflected these discussions of what 
counts as nature. Many of them, inspired by Foucault’s luminous writings and 
lectures on biopolitics, have recognised that ‘population’ is a central category of 
state power and governmentality, whose production derives from and inheres 
in the power to make, sustain or remove life. These ideas have opened up 
new conversations between population geography and medical geography 
that travel far beyond the conventional, spatial-analytic framing of their 
work to open up searching interrogations of what is made to count as ‘life’.141 
lxiv Editors’ Introduction
More proximately, many bio-political geographies circle around the concept 
of ‘bare life’. According to Giorgio Agamben, classical Greek philosophy made 
a vital distinction between political life (bios) and merely existent, biological 
life (zoe). Bare life is poised between the two, as life that is excluded from 
political participation and which can legitimately be abandoned to violence 
and death.142 This bears directly on our discussion of the ‘more-than-human’ 
in two ways. On one side, those who are abandoned to the space of excep-
tion and who embody the spectral figure of what Agamben calls homo sacer 
become, in their very abjectness, limit cases for what is to count as human: in 
effect, they are rendered as ‘less-than-human’, produced through what Judith 
Butler calls ‘exclusionary conceptions of who is normatively human’. These 
reductions were the stock-in-trade of the wars conducted in the shadows 
of 9/11 by the Bush administration; their most visible locus was the US war 
prison at Guantanámo Bay.143 On the other side, the space of vulnerability 
to environmental hazards or disasters can be seen as also always a potential 
space of exception in which marginalised or disadvantaged groups are wilfully 
exposed to disaster and death. This has prompted inquiries into the politic-
ally modulated effects of the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 and Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005, for example, and other equally probing analyses of the polit-
ical roots of famine in the past and the present.144
As with political economy and political ecology, however, it seems that an 
emphasis on constructions of nature and on biopolitics places the emphasis 
squarely on the ‘social’ in multiple forms: on cultural formations, on political 
and military violence, on the political regulation of the life of human popula-
tions. It fails to deal in equal measure with the ‘natural’ and, in particular, still 
maintains the divide or, marginally better, the dialectic between them. This 
has generated two responses. The first is to insist on hybridity, the claim that 
the world is not, and has never been, a tabula rasa waiting to be inscribed as 
we wish. Instead, as Sarah Whatmore emphasises, it’s a world that is always 
already part of us, just as we are a part of it.145 This implies that the conceptual 
dualisms organising Western thought – such as reason/instinct and human/
animal – are not always easy to maintain. On this reading the world is com-
posed of more or less indissoluble relations between entities; these entities are 
at once the medium and the outcome of those relations. The research in this 
vein is both descriptive and explanatory – for example, Morgan Robertson’s 
research into the creation of markets in ‘wetland ecosystem services’ shows 
how and why these markets must adapt to the specific biophysical character 
of wetland environments (even as wetlands are managed and physically rec-
reated according to market logics).146 But much of this work is also ethical in 
character or else focussed on the somatic dimensions of human engagement 
with the non-human world. It’s a call not only to pay closer attention to the 
sheer existence of all the species and materials with whom our own fates are 
entwined; it’s also a call to explore their moral and affective importance, for our-
selves (whoever we happen to be) and for non-human entities. A vivid example 
Editors’ Introduction lxv
is provided by the emergence of an ‘animal geography’, radically different in 
tone and temper from a far older zoogeography, and part of a wider exploration 
of the varied relationships different people have with living species – animal, 
vegetable, insect and even microbiological – that Steve Hinchliffe and Sarah 
Whatmore describe as a new politics of ‘conviviality’.147
In these various ways this work has plainly enlarged our sense of the 
‘human’ in human geography, to the point that some have identified a ‘more 
than human geography’ or even a ‘post-human’ geography. To develop this 
project still further, some of those most closely involved have turned to a form 
of materialism that owes less to Hegel and Marx than to Spinoza and Deleuze. 
Its purpose is to confound the distinction between ‘dull stuff’ (things) and 
‘vibrant life’ (us) in order to bring into view what Jane Bennett calls a ‘vibrant 
materiality’. She understands this to mean not only the capacity of things to 
impede, disrupt or even destroy the designs of humans ‘but also to act as quasi-
agents or forces with trajectories, propensities or tendencies of their own.’148 
When she says ‘things’ she means just that – including everything from metals 
to worms149 – but if this seems unsettling it is not difficult to think in terms of 
the conventional actants of much of physical geography, biogeography and 
zoogeography (though they are not usually thought of like this). This work 
is important for three overlapping reasons that can be aligned directly with 
other research in human geography. First, where critical human geographies 
inspired by the humanities and by certain forms of ‘humanist’ social theory 
privileged human agency  – working to people the skeletal geometries and 
empty landscapes of spatial science – this body of work directs attention to 
the material agency of non-human or ‘not-quite-human’ things. Second, just 
as postcolonial geographies attempt to provide critiques of Eurocentrism, so 
these studies seek to displace anthropocentrism: to challenge a view of the 
world in which human beings are always the privileged beings at its centre. 
Third, the waywardness of nature and the non-human touches (literally so) 
on the liveliness and unruliness of space that has also captivated human 
geographers.
These developments are intended to be profoundly, actively political, but 
when Bennett describes her project as a ‘political ecology’ she means this in a 
radically different sense from the previous authors. She directly challenges their 
sense of the social ‘productions’ and ‘constructions’ of nature by insisting that 
these still inhabit ‘the image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalised matter 
[that] feeds human hubris and our earth-destroying fantasies of conquest and 
consumption.’150 Her enlarged sense of ecology is shared by other human geog-
raphers too, particularly those interested in embodiment. The body, at once a 
natural’ given and yet shaped by the full range of circumstances and relations 
in which people find themselves, is an important medium through which to 
better understand not only the cognitive but also the sensibilities, emotions 
and feelings that must be part of any viable politics. If, at times, some of this 
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research has revelled in the pre-cognitive aspects of human engagement with 
the non-human, other research reminds us that non-human entities – by virtue 
of their specific material affordances and affective capacities, as well as their 
plasticity – can be enrolled into attempts to control nature and people.151
Not all the non-human world is as intransigent as Robertson’s wetlands that 
offer resistance to the logic of capitalist commodification. At times, even a more 
symmetrical approach that gives equal weight to the non-human must con-
cede that metaphors of ‘production’ and ‘construction’ are not always entirely 
inappropriate: metaphors are devices that take us so far, even if they ultim-
ately break down. Indeed, the critical sense of ‘production’ and ‘construction’ – 
and devastation and destruction – are consistent with the belief that we inhabit 
the Anthropocene, a period of momentous, potentially calamitous environ-
mental change in which human interventions are so dominant as to constitute 
a radically new geological epoch.152 To study the Anthropocene ‘symmetrically’ 
is not to downplay what Thomas and his collaborators more than half a century 
ago called humanity’s ‘role in changing the face of the earth’ but to attend 
equally closely to biophysical changes and responses.153
Bennett’s point about nature, the environment and the non-human ‘hav-
ing its own trajectories’ – even when these are in part the product of human 
activities – has been sharpened by Nigel Clark. He argues that attempts to 
achieve a more symmetrical understanding of how the social and the natural 
intertwine in what is at once a life-giving – in fact life-defining – and yet 
deadly embrace are confounded by two problems. Not only have they directed 
attention to the non-human ‘close in’ – to phenomena we encounter directly 
each day or to our own ever-present corporeality – but they have also avoided 
consideration of those processes and events that greatly exceed our capacity 
to cope. Where a term like ‘vitality’ is derived from the life sciences, Clark 
explores the more catastrophic vocabulary of the geological sciences. In his 
view, we need to take far more seriously the power of nature to overwhelm 
us – tsunamis, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions – and to consider how this 
power might oblige us to re-think at a fundamental level our relations with 
other people and with the non-human world. Clark’s manifesto goes far beyond 
the concerns of ‘natural hazards’ to explore existential questions of human 
vulnerability and precariousness on a dynamic planet. While it makes a cer-
tain sense to analyse the human-non-human nexus symmetrically, as critics 
have urged, Clark insists on our recognising that there are situations where 
earthly forces display a vastly greater power than even the most technologically 
advanced societies. The distance between symmetry and asymmetry cannot 
be calibrated by philosophical or theoretical imprimatur: it requires pre-
cisely the careful, substantive analysis of the imbrications of society-nature, 
of the human and non-human, that has long been geography’s (distant) goal. 
Clark’s arguments may seem redolent of environmental determinism, but the 
similarity is superficial. Inhuman nature is a plea to remember how fleeting 
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our presence on the planet is, and to consider how much we can profit from 
responding to the ‘ethical’ call of the earth when it too inflicts damage and 
destruction.154
New Horizons
What next for human geography? All we know – if the last 50 years are anything 
to go by – is that change will be the only constant. The subject’s extraordinary 
intellectual richness and diversity has set it on a productive course: as the 
wider world changes, and intellectual tides turn, human geography will be 
well placed to respond. It is pointless to try to legislate on its future directions 
of travel: there is simply (and we think fortunately) no available mechanism 
for steering the ship. All we can hope for is that human geographers continue 
to practice ‘engaged pluralism’ – the habit of paying respectful attention to, 
borrowing from, and critically appraising the work of others. Out of such 
engagement – which must, of course, extend beyond as well across the field – 
human geography will continue to make important contributions to thought 
and practice. It will do do so on a range of fronts in the belief that a properly 
human geography has to learn from and speak to the concerns of the human-
ities, social sciences and environmental sciences at one and the same time. 
And, above all, that it shares in the wider responsibility to produce and foster 
a more humane geography.
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